Sgromo v. Peacock Alley Entertainment
- Louis Stanton
- 1:20-cv-06658
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 8
In Sgromo v. Peacock Alley Entertainment, Judge Stanton dismissed the complaint, allowed 30 days to replead, and denied two requests.
The dismissal affected Pietro Pasquale Antoni Sgromo’s complaint against Peacock Alley Entertainment, Pyramid Productions, James Day, and NBC Universal Media LLC. Sgromo was given 30 days to replead; his electronic-filing motion was denied, and his summons requests were denied as moot.
What happened
In Sgromo v. Peacock Alley Entertainment, Pietro Pasquale Antoni Sgromo, who represented himself, sued Peacock Alley Entertainment and others over a documentary about his encounter with Bruce McArthur. He alleged contract, fraud, privacy, disability, emotional-distress, and false-advertising or unfair-competition claims, seeking money damages.
The court ruled that the complaint did not state a federal claim. It found that the filming defendants were not the restaurant that qualified as a public place under the disability law, and that Sgromo did not allege facts showing trademark-related consumer confusion or a right to control the film’s content. The court also questioned whether diversity jurisdiction existed because Sgromo and several defendants were Canadian.
Judge Louis L. Stanton dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim but gave Sgromo 30 days to file an amended complaint. The judge denied his request to file electronically and denied his requests for summonses as moot.
The detailed version
- Sgromo v. Peacock Alley Entertainment · No. 1:20-cv-06658
- Louis Stanton
- Sept. 9, 2020
Background
Pietro Pasquale Antoni Sgromo, also known as Peter Anthony Sgromo, proceeded without a lawyer and invoked diversity jurisdiction. He sued Peacock Alley Entertainment, Pyramid Productions, James Day, and NBC Universal Media LLC. The opinion describes Sgromo as a Canadian national residing in Canada; Peacock as a Canadian media company; Pyramid as a production company located in Canada and Los Angeles, California; Day as a producer located in Canada and California; and NBC Universal Media LLC as a media company headquartered in the Southern District of New York.
Sgromo alleged that he agreed to tell the defendants his story about narrowly escaping strangulation by Bruce McArthur, whom the complaint described as a confessed and convicted purported serial killer. Sgromo said he spent eight months gathering police reports and other evidence for a documentary, but Day later gave him a contract containing an arbitration clause and no compensation. Sgromo also alleged that the defendants did not let his service dog remain with him on set and failed to secure a door through which the dog escaped onto a busy street, worsening his post-traumatic stress disorder.
The complaint asserted six counts: breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the right to privacy, violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Sgromo also referred to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and alleged that the defendants used his name and likeness to promote and advertise a film. He sought money damages.
Court’s Analysis
Because Sgromo had been allowed to proceed without paying filing fees, the court was required to dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, sought damages from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court stated that it would read a self-represented litigant’s complaint liberally and consider the strongest claims suggested by the allegations.
Americans with Disabilities Act claim. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits disability discrimination in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place open to the public. The court held that Sgromo could not state a Title III claim because the alleged conduct was taken by the media companies during filming, not by the unnamed restaurant where filming occurred. Although the restaurant ordinarily would qualify as a public accommodation, the defendants’ use of the restaurant as a film set did not make their conduct the conduct of a public accommodation. The court also noted that the allegations showed the service dog had been allowed inside the restaurant before it escaped.
Lanham Act claim. Although the complaint mentioned the Lanham Act only once and did not list it as one of the six counts, the court construed it as asserting a claim under section 43(a). Such a claim generally requires allegations that the plaintiff’s mark is legally protected and that the defendant’s use is likely to confuse consumers about the source or sponsorship of goods. The court said that a claim can sometimes concern a person’s likeness or persona when a work falsely suggests that the person sponsored, endorsed, or was involved in it.
The court nevertheless found that Sgromo did not allege that he owned a registered or unregistered trademark, that the film was about him, or that the film or its publicity materials suggested that he sponsored, endorsed, or was otherwise involved in it. The court understood Sgromo’s complaint to challenge the defendants’ failure to include his research in the film, but held that the Lanham Act does not give him control over the content of another person’s artistic work.
Diversity jurisdiction. Sgromo also relied on diversity jurisdiction for his state-law claims. The court explained that diversity jurisdiction generally requires the citizenship arrangement described in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It stated that diversity is lacking when one side consists only of foreign parties and the other side also consists only of foreign parties. Because Sgromo was Canadian and Peacock, Pyramid, and Day were alleged to be Canadian or Canadian residents, the court concluded that the case appeared to be a dispute between foreign parties and that Sgromo could not establish diversity jurisdiction under the provision he invoked.
Disposition
The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the screening statute for complaints filed without prepayment of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2). It granted Sgromo 30 days to replead because amendment might not be futile, while expressing doubt that he could cure the complaint’s defects. The court denied Sgromo’s motion for permission to file electronically because he had not completed the required introductory course in the district. It denied his requests for summonses as moot. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.