Melendez v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Four related cases concerned parents of children with serious brain injuries and global developmental impairments. Brenda L. Melendez brought the cases individually and as parent and natural guardian of J.C. Carolyn Mason and Nahoko and Kentaro Mizuta joined the fourth case as parents and natural guardians of A.D. and Y.M. The defendants were the New York City Department of Education, Chancellor Richard Carranza in some cases, and the New York State Education Department in one case.

The parents sought orders requiring the Department of Education to fund tuition and related services at iBrain while their education disputes were being resolved. The children had previously attended iHope, a private school, during the 2017–2018 school year, and the parents unilaterally moved them to iBrain for later school years. Administrative hearing officers issued orders finding that iBrain was substantially similar to the children’s prior programs and directing the Department of Education to fund the placements in various periods.

The court had previously addressed J.C.’s claims in an earlier related proceeding. In that proceeding, it ruled that J.C.’s parent could seek reimbursement for iBrain services that were substantially similar to services received at iHope, and it sent the matter back for further factual findings. The administrative orders at issue in the four cases were later issued while the related proceedings and appeals were ongoing.

Parties’ Positions

The defendants asked the court to dismiss the four cases and vacate two underlying administrative pendency orders in light of a recent Second Circuit decision. They argued that the decision rejected using substantial similarity as a basis for requiring the school district to fund a parent’s unilateral choice of a new school during the administrative proceedings.

The plaintiffs did not contest dismissal as to A.D. and Y.M. They argued that the Second Circuit decision did not prevent a finding that J.C.’s program at iBrain was his educational placement for purposes of the stay-put rule. They also argued that the school district had not offered J.C. a program maintaining his prior placement and that iHope was effectively unavailable because it had changed.

Court’s Analysis

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires public educational agencies to provide children with disabilities a free appropriate public education. Its stay-put provision generally requires a child to remain in the current educational placement while an administrative or court proceeding is pending, unless the parents and school agency agree otherwise.

The court relied on the Second Circuit’s decision holding that, when parents unilaterally enroll their children at iBrain, they do so at their own financial risk. The court explained that parents may later seek reimbursement after the education dispute is resolved, but only if they satisfy the applicable three-part test: the school district’s proposed placement violated the statute, the parents’ private placement was appropriate, and equitable considerations favor reimbursement.

The court acknowledged that the Second Circuit had not rejected substantial similarity in every context. But it held that the Second Circuit had rejected the plaintiffs’ assumption that parents could use substantial similarity to require the school district to pay for a new school they selected themselves. According to the court, a school district may use substantial similarity when providing a comparable program, but parents may not use that standard to convert their unilateral school choice into a funded stay-put placement.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that exceptional circumstances applied. The record did not show that iHope was unavailable or unable to provide the children’s pendency services, and the plaintiffs had not shown that the Department of Education refused to provide any pendency services. The court stated that the school district, rather than the parent, decides how to provide the agreed educational program during the dispute, so long as the decision is made in good faith.

Ruling

Judge Edgardo Ramos held that the Second Circuit’s decision controlled the plaintiffs’ requests for orders requiring funding at iBrain. The court GRANTED Defendants’ motion to dismiss the cases and DENIED Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief. It also VACATED the two underlying administrative decisions because they relied on substantial similarity as the basis for pendency funding after the parents had unilaterally moved the children from iHope to iBrain. The court directed the clerk to close all four cases. The opinion did not state that the dismissals were with or without prejudice.