Melendez v. Carranza

Background

This order addresses four related cases brought by Brenda L. Melendez, individually and as parent and natural guardian of J.C.; in one case, Carolyn Mason, individually and as parent and natural guardian of A.D.; and Nahoko Mizuta and Kentaro Mizuta, individually and as parents and natural guardians of Y.M. The parents sought court orders requiring the New York City Department of Education, its Chancellor Richard Carranza, and, in one case, the New York State Education Department to fund tuition at iBrain.

The parents described iBrain as the school the children attended and as the placement they had unilaterally selected while their ongoing administrative education complaints were being resolved. On July 24, 2020, the court denied the parents’ request for a preliminary injunction, which is an order providing temporary emergency relief, and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court relied on a recent Second Circuit decision holding that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act did not require the City to fund a student’s program at iBrain during the dispute when the parents had enrolled the student there at their own financial risk.

Motion for Reconsideration

The parents filed motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 asking the court to reconsider its earlier order. Those rules allow reconsideration only in limited circumstances, such as a change in controlling law, new evidence, an overlooked controlling decision or fact, clear error, or the need to prevent serious unfairness. The court explained that reconsideration is not a way to repeat old arguments, present new theories, obtain another hearing on the merits, or substitute for an appeal.

The parents argued that the court had overlooked a difference between their cases and the Second Circuit case. They said that, unlike in the earlier case, the City had not chosen iHope as J.C.’s ongoing placement; instead, iHope became that placement by operation of law. The court stated that it had already considered and rejected that argument. It also stated that J.C. had an established ongoing placement, making the asserted distinction immaterial.

The opinion includes a footnote stating that, although the court referred to the plaintiffs collectively, the briefing addressed only J.C.; it therefore said that arguments concerning the Mizutas and the other plaintiffs appeared to have been waived.

Disposition

The court found that the plaintiffs had not shown any change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or serious unfairness. It held that the motions merely rehashed arguments already considered and rejected.

The application was DENIED. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the four reconsideration motions: 19 Civ. 2928, Doc. 47; 19 Civ. 8726, Doc. 68; 20 Civ. 823, Doc. 40; and 20 Civ. 1464, Doc. 34.