State of New York v. United States Department of Homeland Security

Background

The court considered two consolidated actions challenging the Department of Homeland Security’s 2019 rule, “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds.” The rule changed the meaning of “public charge” and established criteria for deciding whether a noncitizen seeking admission to the United States or adjustment of status was likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs were several governments and nonprofit organizations. They argued, among other things, that the rule exceeded the agency’s authority, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, conflicted with the Rehabilitation Act and other federal statutes, and violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection guarantee.

In October 2019, the court had issued a nationwide preliminary injunction blocking implementation of the rule and postponing its effective date. The Supreme Court later stayed that injunction, and the rule took effect on February 24, 2020. After the COVID-19 pandemic began, the government issued an alert stating that COVID-19 testing, treatment, and preventive care would not be considered in public-charge determinations under specified circumstances. The plaintiffs argued that the alert did not sufficiently reduce the rule’s harmful effects.

Motions to Dismiss

The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court rejected the standing and ripeness arguments, finding that the organizational plaintiffs had diverted resources and that the governmental plaintiffs had adequately alleged economic and other injuries. The court also found that the facial challenges were ready for review because the rule was already in effect and the legal issues did not depend on future factual events.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims under the Administrative Procedure Act were sufficient to proceed. It relied on its earlier conclusion that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in arguing that the rule’s definition of “public charge” conflicted with the Immigration and Nationality Act and was arbitrary and capricious. The court also held that the governmental plaintiffs adequately alleged that the rule violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by treating disability as a negative health factor, and that they adequately alleged procedural violations involving the rule’s benefit thresholds and method of counting multiple benefits.

The court held that the organizational plaintiffs and governmental plaintiffs adequately stated equal-protection claims. It found that the allegations of disproportionate effects on nonwhite immigrants, combined with statements attributed to high-level officials, plausibly alleged discriminatory intent. The court did not accept the defendants’ argument that the Supreme Court’s decision concerning the rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program required dismissal.

The court did, however, grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III of the organizational plaintiffs’ complaint. That count alleged that the Department of Homeland Security and Citizenship and Immigration Services lacked authority to issue the rule. The court held that federal law gave the Secretary of Homeland Security responsibility for administering public-charge determinations and associated rulemaking. Count III was dismissed. The opinion does not state that this dismissal was with or without prejudice.

COVID-19 Preliminary Injunction

The plaintiffs sought a new, limited preliminary injunction under Rule 65 and an alternative stay under Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act. They asked the court to block the rule during the national health emergency. They also requested an alternative ruling under Rule 62.1 stating that the court would issue the injunction if the Second Circuit later determined that the pending appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to consider new relief based on facts and circumstances that were not before it when it issued the 2019 injunction. It reasoned that the new motion concerned the COVID-19 pandemic and a new factual record, rather than the precise issues under review in the pending appeal. The court also concluded that a new injunction would not improperly override the Supreme Court’s stay because that stay had been issued on a different record and the Supreme Court had not decided the underlying merits.

The court found that the plaintiffs had shown likely success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balancing of the equities, and that an injunction served the public interest. It credited evidence that some immigrants were refusing Medicaid enrollment, COVID-19 testing, or treatment because they feared that receiving public benefits could harm their immigration status. The court found the government’s alert insufficient because of its limited scope, uncertainty about Medicaid enrollment, lack of meaningful protection for economic benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and the possibility that the alert could be changed or withdrawn.

The court determined that nationwide relief was appropriate because the rule applied across the country and because a geographically limited order could produce inconsistent immigration decisions and fail to address interconnected public-health risks. The court therefore granted a temporary nationwide injunction and stayed application of the rule during any declared national health emergency responding to the COVID-19 outbreak.

Disposition

Judge George B. Daniels granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary stay under Section 705. The defendants were enjoined from enforcing, applying, implementing, or treating the rule as effective during a declared national health emergency responding to COVID-19. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III of the organizational plaintiffs’ complaint, while the other challenged claims survived the dismissal motions. The opinion also served as an indicative ruling that the court would issue the preliminary injunction if the Second Circuit remanded the matter for that purpose.