Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli
- George Daniels
- 1:19-cv-07993
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 6
In Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli, Judge Daniels denied the government’s request to pause a nationwide injunction blocking the public-charge rule during appeal.
The ruling affected the federal officials and agencies seeking to implement the public-charge rule, the organizational plaintiffs and the noncitizens they serve, and the public. The nationwide injunction remained in effect while the appeal proceeded.
What happened
Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli challenged a federal immigration rule changing how the government determines whether a noncitizen is likely to become a public charge. Judge Daniels had previously issued a nationwide injunction blocking the rule and delaying its effective date.
The government asked the court to pause that injunction while it appealed. It argued that the plaintiffs lacked the right to sue, that their claims were not ready for review, and that the rule was legally valid. The government also claimed that continuing the injunction would cause financial, administrative, and other harms.
Judge George B. Daniels denied the motion. He concluded that the government had not shown likely success on appeal or sufficient harm, while the plaintiffs, noncitizens, and the public could suffer immediate harm if the injunction were paused.
The detailed version
- Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli · No. 1:19-cv-07993
- George Daniels
- Dec. 2, 2019
Background
The plaintiffs challenged the federal government’s 2019 rule, titled “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds.” The rule changed the immigration-law definition of a “public charge,” a person considered likely to become primarily dependent on the government. The plaintiffs sought to stop the rule from being implemented and enforced.
On October 11, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary order issued before a final decision to prevent alleged harm while the case continues. The court’s order applied nationwide and also postponed the rule’s effective date. The defendants appealed that order and then asked the court to stay, or pause, the preliminary injunction while the appeal was pending.
Arguments
The defendants argued that they were likely to succeed on appeal. They renewed arguments that the plaintiffs lacked organizational standing, meaning a sufficient legal connection to sue; that the claims were not ripe, meaning not ready for judicial review; and that the plaintiffs were outside the group protected by the rule’s governing laws. On the merits, the defendants argued that the rule properly implemented the immigration-law principle of self-sufficiency and that the court had wrongly found the rule arbitrary and capricious, meaning inadequately justified and irrational under administrative law.
The defendants also argued that the government and the public would suffer irreparable harm without a stay. They cited possible additional government spending, difficulty revisiting immigration decisions later, reduced future effectiveness of the rule, and administrative burdens from delaying implementation. They asked at minimum that the injunction be limited rather than nationwide.
The plaintiffs argued that pausing the injunction would immediately harm their organizations and the people they serve. According to the opinion, they said the rule would force them to divert significant resources, deter law-abiding immigrants from receiving benefits to which they were legally entitled, and increase health and economic instability.
Legal standard
For a stay pending appeal, the court considered four factors: the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without a stay, harm to other interested parties if a stay issued, and the public interest. The party seeking the stay bears the difficult burden of showing that a stay is necessary. The court noted that these factors substantially overlap with the factors for a preliminary injunction.
Court’s analysis
The court found the defendants’ arguments unpersuasive and said the motion largely repeated arguments previously rejected when the court issued the preliminary injunction. The court emphasized that the defendants had not reasonably explained why “public charge” should be redefined as receiving one or more public benefits for more than 12 months in a 36-month period. It also stated that the existing interpretation had not used that definition, that no precedent supported it, and that Congress had not indicated a desire to redefine the term in that way.
The court further distinguished the new rule from the government’s earlier Field Guidance. The earlier guidance distinguished cash assistance and long-term institutionalization from supplemental, non-cash benefits, and stated that participation in non-cash programs was not evidence of poverty or dependence.
The court also concluded that the defendants had not adequately shown irreparable injury to the federal agencies or demonstrated that those alleged injuries outweighed the harms identified by the plaintiffs and the public. The court said the injunction maintained the existing framework and that the defendants had not provided a plausible basis for claiming that the rule’s future effectiveness would be reduced or that significant administrative burdens would result. By contrast, the court found that the plaintiffs had shown immediate and irreparable injuries, and that the rule could make noncitizens and the public more vulnerable to health and economic instability.
Disposition
Judge George B. Daniels denied the defendants’ motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The opinion did not issue a final decision on the underlying challenge to the rule in this order; it ruled on whether to pause the earlier injunction while the appeal proceeded.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.