Bunn v. Dash

Background

Monique Bunn sued Damon Anthony Dash, Damon Dash Studios, Poppington LLC, and Raquel Horn. The opinion states that Bunn is a Pennsylvania resident and a photographer. She alleged that she traveled to Los Angeles to conduct business with Dash and his company, stayed at Dash and Horn’s home, and worked at the company’s studio. She claimed that Dash sexually assaulted her while she was sleeping and that Dash and Horn later refused to return professional and personal property she had left at the studio.

Bunn asserted claims for conversion, sexual battery, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. She sought damages exceeding $50 million. After Bunn filed an affidavit stating that a process server had left the summons and complaint at a commercial mailbox in California and mailed copies there, the clerk entered default against the defendants. Bunn then sought a default judgment.

The defendants moved to set aside the clerk’s entry of default and dismiss the case. They argued that service was defective, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction—the court’s authority over the defendants—and that California was the proper venue, meaning the proper federal court location for the case. Bunn opposed the motion and asked for more time to serve the defendants and to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Service and Default

The court held that Bunn did not properly serve Dash and Horn under California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.20(c). That provision permits service at a commercial mailbox when it is the only address reasonably known for the person being served. The court found that Bunn had not shown that the mailbox was the only address she could reasonably have known. She had stayed at Dash and Horn’s home, traveled among the home, the company’s studio, and other locations, and did not disclaim knowledge of the studio’s location.

Because valid service is required before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction, the court denied Bunn’s motion for a default judgment and granted the defendants’ motion in part to vacate the clerk’s entry of default. The court did not reach the parties’ detailed disputes about Dash’s and Horn’s residences or contacts with New York.

Venue and Transfer

The court concluded that venue was proper in the Central District of California because the events underlying all of Bunn’s claims occurred in or near Los Angeles. It found that venue was not proper in the Southern District of New York because none of the relevant events occurred there and Bunn had not shown that Dash and Horn were domiciled in New York. The court noted that Poppington LLC was a New York company, but explained that venue under the applicable provision required all defendants to reside in New York.

The court also considered transfer for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. It found that the case had no material connection to New York and that Pennsylvania’s only identified connection was Bunn’s residence. The court agreed that transfer, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate procedure.

Disposition

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil denied Bunn’s motions for a default judgment, an enlargement of time to serve the defendants, and transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The defendants’ motion to vacate the clerk’s entry of default and dismiss the case was granted in part as to vacating the default for lack of proper service and denied in part as to dismissal. The court ordered the clerk to transfer the case to the Central District of California and then close the case. The opinion did not decide the merits of Bunn’s underlying assault, property, negligence, or emotional-distress claims.