White v. United States

Background

Christopher White, Michael Santiago, Kenneth Smith, and Stephen Smith filed separate but largely identical petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence. They sought to vacate their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which imposes additional mandatory consecutive punishment when a person uses, carries, or possesses a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.

The underlying superseding indictment charged the petitioners with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, three Hobbs Act robberies, and using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with the conspiracy and robberies. The petitioners pleaded guilty to at least two counts. White pleaded guilty to one Hobbs Act robbery count and the firearm count; Santiago, Kenneth Smith, and Stephen Smith did not plead guilty to the robbery counts at issue.

Legal issue

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis held that § 924(c)(3)(B), known as the residual clause, was unconstitutionally vague. The petitioners argued that their firearm convictions depended on Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, which no longer qualified as a crime of violence after Davis. Santiago, Kenneth Smith, and Stephen Smith also argued that Hobbs Act robbery could not be used as an alternative predicate because the robbery charges against them had been dismissed as part of their plea agreements. Santiago and White alternatively argued that Hobbs Act robbery did not satisfy § 924(c)’s elements clause, which covers felonies requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

The Government argued that the claims were procedurally defaulted because the petitioners had not raised them on direct appeal. It also argued that the firearm convictions were based on both Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and the separate Hobbs Act robberies. The court declined to decide procedural default because it concluded that the petitions failed on the merits.

Court’s analysis

The court held that a § 924(c) conviction requires legally sufficient proof that the predicate crime was committed, but does not require a separate conviction for that predicate crime. Therefore, Hobbs Act robbery could serve as a predicate even though Santiago, Kenneth Smith, and Stephen Smith were not convicted of robbery.

The court relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that substantive Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause after Davis. It further held that a § 924(c) conviction based on multiple predicates may survive if one predicate is invalidated, provided the record contains a sufficient factual basis showing that the defendant committed another valid predicate offense.

The court found that each petitioner’s plea admissions supplied that factual basis. White admitted committing a Hobbs Act robbery and knowing that a group member would use a gun. Santiago admitted knowing that weapons would be used and driving a getaway car containing other participants, weapons, and cash. Stephen Smith admitted participating in gunpoint robberies, forcibly taking money from an armored-truck guard at gunpoint, and firing a gun. Kenneth Smith admitted attempting to rob property and knowing that a firearm would be used during the robberies.

The court also concluded that White, Santiago, and Kenneth Smith were sufficiently involved under an aiding-and-abetting theory. Although the record showed that only Stephen Smith possessed and used a gun during the robberies, the court found that the other three had advance knowledge that a firearm would be used and participated in the underlying robberies.

Disposition

The court denied Christopher White’s, Michael Santiago’s, Kenneth Smith’s, and Stephen Smith’s petitions to vacate their § 924(c) convictions. It directed the clerk to terminate the specified pending motions, terminate the pending motions and deadlines in related case No. 19-CV-9086, and close that case.