White v. United States

Background

Christopher White, Michael Santiago, Kenneth Smith, and Stephen Smith filed separate motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence. They sought to vacate their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which imposes additional consecutive punishment when a person uses, carries, or possesses a firearm during or in furtherance of a crime of violence.

The underlying indictment charged one conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, three Hobbs Act robberies, and a firearm offense. The firearm count alleged that the firearms were used, carried, or possessed in connection with both the robbery conspiracy and the robberies. Each petitioner pleaded guilty to at least two counts. White pleaded guilty to a Hobbs Act robbery count; Santiago, Kenneth Smith, and Stephen Smith did not plead guilty to robbery counts, although the court found that their plea statements established that they committed or aided and abetted robberies.

Arguments and governing law

The petitioners relied on United States v. Davis, in which the Supreme Court held that the “residual clause” of § 924(c)’s definition of a crime of violence was unconstitutionally vague. The court explained that § 924(c) also contains an “elements clause,” covering a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property.

The petitioners argued that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery could no longer support their firearm convictions after Davis. They also argued that Hobbs Act robbery could not be used as an alternative predicate because some robbery charges had been dismissed as part of their plea agreements. Santiago and White alternatively argued that Hobbs Act robbery did not satisfy the elements clause. The Government argued that the claims were procedurally defaulted and that the convictions were based on both the conspiracy and the substantive robberies.

Court’s analysis

The court did not decide the Government’s procedural-default argument because it concluded that the petitions failed on the merits.

First, the court held that a § 924(c) conviction may rely on a predicate offense even if the defendant was not separately convicted of that offense, so long as the record contains legally sufficient proof that the offense was committed. Therefore, the dismissal of robbery charges against Santiago, Kenneth Smith, and Stephen Smith did not prevent Hobbs Act robbery from serving as a predicate for their firearm convictions.

Second, relying on binding Second Circuit precedent, the court held that substantive Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause after Davis. The court recognized that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery could not serve as the valid predicate after Davis, but explained that a conviction based on multiple predicates may survive if another predicate remains valid and the record factually establishes that the defendant committed it.

Third, the court found an adequate factual basis for the robbery predicate in each petitioner’s plea record. White pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and admitted that he knew a group member would use a gun during the robbery. Santiago admitted that he knew weapons would be used and drove the getaway car containing members of the group, weapons, and cash. Stephen Smith admitted participating in gunpoint robberies and forcibly taking money from an armored-truck guard at gunpoint. Kenneth Smith admitted participating in an attempted robbery and knowing that a co-conspirator would be armed. The court also found that White, Santiago, and Kenneth Smith could be held responsible for the firearm offense under an aiding-and-abetting theory because their admissions showed advance knowledge that a firearm would be used.

Disposition

The court denied Christopher White’s, Michael Santiago’s, Kenneth Smith’s, and Stephen Smith’s petitions to vacate their § 924(c) convictions. Judge Valerie Caproni declined to issue certificates of appealability because the petitioners had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied. The court noted that the petitioners could request certificates directly from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, directed the clerk to terminate the pending motions and deadlines, and ordered the civil cases closed.

Record note

The opinion’s caption lists White’s civil docket as 19-CV-9086, while a footnote refers to White’s civil case as 19-CV-9806. This summary uses the docket numbers listed in the caption.