Grant v. City of New York

Background

James Grant, a former New York Police Department officer, alleged that officials pressured him to resign in 2016. At the time, Grant was a Deputy Inspector and commanding officer of the 19th Precinct. The complaint alleged that a union official told Grant that Police Commissioner William J. Bratton and Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters Lawrence Byrne intended to demote and terminate him unless he retired immediately.

Grant alleged that resigning required him to give up accrued vacation and compensatory time. He said that his resignation became effective shortly before he reached 20 years of service credit, which affected his pension and other retirement benefits. He was later charged with accepting bribes and was found not guilty after a 2018 trial.

Claims and motion

Grant sued the City of New York, Bratton, and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims against state or local officials for violating constitutional rights. His first claim alleged that the individual defendants deprived him of a property interest in his employment and retirement benefits without the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. His second claim alleged that the City was responsible under the municipal-liability doctrine for actions taken by high-level city policymakers.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They argued that Grant had an adequate post-deprivation remedy through an Article 78 proceeding, a New York court procedure for reviewing certain government actions. They also argued that qualified immunity protected the individual defendants and that Bratton and Byrne were not city policymakers.

Court’s reasoning

The court explained that a procedural due-process claim requires a plaintiff to identify a protected property right, show that the government deprived him of it, and show that the deprivation occurred without constitutionally adequate procedures. The defendants did not dispute that Grant’s employment was a property right or that he was deprived of it. The issue was whether the available procedures were adequate.

The court relied on a Second Circuit decision involving an allegedly coerced resignation from public employment. That decision held that a pre-resignation hearing was not feasible or constitutionally required because the central question in a forced-resignation case is whether the resignation was voluntary or involuntary, something that cannot be determined in advance. The court further held that an Article 78 proceeding could provide sufficient post-deprivation process.

The court agreed with the reasoning of a recent Southern District of New York decision involving similar allegations arising from the corruption investigation concerning Jeremy Reichberg and Jona Rechnitz. It concluded that the Second Circuit’s rule remained valid and applied to Grant’s allegations. Because an Article 78 proceeding was available, the court held that Grant had not stated a due-process claim.

The court then held that the claim against the City also failed because Grant had not plausibly alleged a constitutional violation. In light of that conclusion, the court said it did not need to address qualified immunity. The opinion does not resolve the defendants’ separate argument that Bratton and Byrne were not municipal policymakers.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It directed the Clerk of Court to close the case. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.