Doherty v. Bice

Background

Jason Doherty, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Patricia Bice, Jared Stammer, and Qui Qui Balascio in their individual and official capacities. The defendants were identified as officials at Purchase College, State University of New York. Doherty alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process and under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for disability discrimination.

Doherty alleged that Purchase College issued three no-contact orders against him during freshman orientation. He alleged that the college had no specific appeal process, hearing, or other procedure for challenging the orders, and that no reason or factual assertion was required for issuing them. He also alleged that he had Asperger Syndrome, was classified as a disabled student, and experienced anxiety, depression, difficulty attending class and using campus facilities, and academic disruption because of the orders.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. For purposes of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed them in the light most favorable to Doherty.

Due-Process Claims

To state a procedural due-process claim, Doherty had to allege that the defendants deprived him of a protected life, liberty, or property interest without constitutionally sufficient procedures.

The court rejected the alleged property interest at the pleading stage. New York law recognizes an implied contract between a college and its students, and such a contract can sometimes support a constitutionally protected property interest. But the court found that Doherty had not alleged that the defendants acted in bad faith or with ill will, and the complaint contained no facts from which that inference could fairly be drawn. The property-interest due-process claim was dismissed without prejudice.

The court also rejected the alleged liberty interest. It distinguished cases involving disciplinary suspensions, where a student’s reputation and education may be affected, because Doherty had not been suspended or expelled. The court declined to extend a protected liberty interest to the circumstances of the no-contact orders. The liberty-interest due-process claim was dismissed with prejudice.

Because Doherty had not adequately alleged either a protected property interest or a protected liberty interest, the court did not decide whether Purchase College provided constitutionally insufficient procedures.

Official-Capacity Constitutional Claims

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Doherty’s § 1983 claims against the defendants in their official capacities. The court explained that New York had not waived its sovereign immunity for § 1983 suits and that § 1983 did not override that immunity. The exception allowing suits against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law and prospective relief did not apply because Doherty had not pleaded an ongoing constitutional violation. The § 1983 claims against the defendants in their official capacities were dismissed with prejudice.

The defendants also raised qualified immunity, which can protect officials from damages claims in some circumstances. The court did not address that defense because it had dismissed Doherty’s constitutional claims and noted that qualified immunity usually depends on facts better considered at the summary-judgment stage.

ADA Claims

Doherty claimed that the defendants violated Title II of the ADA by discriminating against him because of his disability. The defendants challenged only whether the alleged denial of access to college services occurred because of his disability.

The court found that Doherty had not adequately alleged intentional discrimination or disparate treatment. His allegation that he believed he was being discriminated against because of his disability was insufficient by itself. But the court allowed his claims to proceed under two other theories.

First, the court held that Doherty sufficiently pleaded a disparate-impact claim. A disparate-impact claim challenges a facially neutral practice that allegedly has a significantly adverse or disproportionate effect on people with a particular disability. The court found that the issuance of no-contact orders was an outwardly neutral practice and that, at this early stage, it was reasonable to infer that students with Doherty’s type of disability were adversely affected.

Second, the court held that Doherty sufficiently pleaded a failure-to-accommodate claim. He alleged that the defendants did not consider his disability when issuing the orders, did not consider whether the orders were sought to tease or bully him because of his disability, and took no steps to accommodate his disability. The court found these allegations sufficient when considered with his allegations that his disability made it difficult for him to access campus facilities and services.

The court also refused to dismiss Doherty’s ADA claims for monetary damages on sovereign-immunity grounds. Applying the required analysis, the court found that the alleged practice violated Title II, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and nevertheless fell within Congress’s valid authority to address disability discrimination in public education. The court therefore allowed the ADA monetary claims to continue on that ground.

However, Title II of the ADA does not allow claims against state officials in their individual capacities. The court dismissed any ADA claims against Bice, Stammer, and Balascio in their individual capacities with prejudice. The ADA claims could proceed against them in their official capacities.

Injunctive Relief Against Stammer

The court dismissed with prejudice Doherty’s claim for injunctive relief against Stammer. Doherty had not specifically alleged that Stammer had authority to provide the requested relief, and Doherty did not contest that point in his briefing.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The following claims were dismissed with prejudice: the liberty-interest due-process claims; the due-process claims against the defendants in their official capacities; the ADA claims against the defendants in their individual capacities; and the claim for injunctive relief against Stammer.

The property-interest due-process claims were dismissed without prejudice. The surviving claims were Doherty’s ADA claim for monetary relief against Stammer in his official capacity and his ADA claims for monetary and equitable relief against Bice and Balascio in their official capacities.

The court gave Doherty until November 16, 2020, to file a second amended complaint reasserting claims dismissed without prejudice. If he did not do so, those claims would be deemed dismissed with prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion to dismiss.