Doe v. Barr

Background

John Doe alleged that conditions imposed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement after he turned 18 violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, and the Fifth Amendment. The opinion states that Doe had been identified as an unaccompanied child, placed in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and later placed in long-term foster care. Before his 18th birthday, Catholic Charities asked that he be released to his foster mother rather than detained.

On February 19, 2019, Doe was detained at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement office after reporting for discharge from foster care. Several hours later, he was released to his foster mother on a $1,500 bond. In October 2019, he reported to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the bond was cancelled, and he was later processed for release on his own recognizance. The bond was returned to his foster mother in November 2019.

Claims and procedural history

Doe’s amended complaint sought orders requiring the Government to cancel bond or other financial conditions, return posted bond or bail, and release him on his own recognizance. He also sought an injunction barring the Government from using a current or former long-term foster-care enrollee’s lack of biological family ties in the United States as an indicator of flight risk. His requested declarations addressed the alleged failure to use the least restrictive setting, provide alternatives to detention, avoid unlawful arrest and detention, avoid imposing bond, impose a non-excessive bond, and avoid arbitrary or unlawful flight-risk assessments.

The Government moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Court’s analysis

The court began and ended with mootness. Mootness means that a case no longer presents a live dispute that a court can remedy. The court concluded that Doe’s claims were moot because he had been released on his own recognizance and the bond had been returned. Those events eliminated the need for an order cancelling the bond, returning the money, or releasing him on his own recognizance.

The court also held that Doe’s request for an injunction concerning the use of biological-family ties as an indicator of flight risk was moot. Given Doe’s current release status, the court found that such an evaluation was not imminent absent changed circumstances. Because the requested injunction was moot, the court also concluded that it could not issue the requested declaratory judgment, which requires a real and immediate legal controversy.

The court rejected Doe’s argument that the Government’s voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct left a live dispute. It found that there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur and that the effects of the alleged violation had been completely and irrevocably eliminated. The court noted that Doe remained free during his removal proceedings and that Immigration and Customs Enforcement would not detain him or impose additional release conditions absent a violation of his release conditions or changed circumstances, such as issuance of a removal order.

Disposition

The court did not address the Government’s alternative grounds for dismissal. Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, dismissed Doe’s claims, and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case.