P.L. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Background

The plaintiffs included representative plaintiffs identified as R.F.J., A.R.B., J.C., P.L., K.T., and A.Q., along with Brooklyn Defenders Services, the Legal Aid Society, and The Bronx Defenders. They sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and several government officials in their official capacities.

The lawsuit challenged a policy announced by the New York Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in June 2018. Before the policy, detained immigrants appearing at the Varick Street Immigration Court typically attended hearings in person. Under the new policy, they primarily appeared through video teleconferencing. The plaintiffs alleged that technological and scheduling problems limited their ability to participate meaningfully in removal proceedings. They asserted claims under the Due Process Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.

Earlier rulings and motion

On June 21, 2019, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and entered judgment for the defendants. The court relied on Section 1252(b)(9) of the Real ID Act, which generally makes judicial review of legal and factual questions arising from removal proceedings available only through review of a final removal order. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims challenged part of the process by which removability would be decided.

The plaintiffs later moved under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter the judgment. On March 13, 2020, the court denied part of that motion but held its decision on Count VI, the Administrative Procedure Act claim, while the Supreme Court considered a related case. The court then considered the remaining portion of the motion after the Supreme Court issued its decision.

Arguments

The plaintiffs argued that the organizational plaintiffs were challenging the process used to adopt the video policy, rather than the removal proceedings themselves. They also argued that the court’s test—examining the substance of the relief sought—did not apply to their Administrative Procedure Act claims, and that they had no adequate opportunity to pursue those claims in immigration proceedings or through a petition for review. They relied on decisions from outside the court’s appellate circuit and on the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California.

Court’s analysis

The court explained that altering a judgment under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy generally limited to an intervening change in controlling law, newly available evidence, clear error, or the need to prevent manifest injustice. A party may not use the motion simply to present new theories or take a second opportunity to argue the case.

The court declined to alter the dismissal of Count VI. It stated that it had considered the organizational plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims and had applied the substance-of-the-relief test. In the court’s view, those claims challenged part of the process by which removability would be determined and were therefore barred by Section 1252(b)(9). The plaintiffs had not identified controlling authority establishing that the test did not apply to an Administrative Procedure Act claim or to claims brought by organizational plaintiffs.

The court also ruled that the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents did not require a different result. The court read Regents as repeating language from an earlier Supreme Court decision stating that Section 1252(b)(9) does not bar claims that do not seek review of a removal order, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined. Because the court had relied on that same language in its earlier decision, it found no basis to change the judgment. The court therefore denied the plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter Judgment as to the dismissal of Count VI.