Starker v. Adamovych

Background

Oscar Starker sued Nataliya Adamovych, the City of New York, the New York Police Department, and Detective Lodato. He sought damages based on alleged malicious prosecution, false arrest, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On September 30, 2019, the court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The court gave Starker 30 days to file a second amended complaint and stated that the complaint would otherwise be dismissed with prejudice.

Starker then moved to vacate the judgment, reconsider the September 30, 2019 decision, and file a second amended complaint.

Legal Standards

The court treated the motions to vacate and reconsider as motions under Local Civil Rule 6.3. Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally available only when the moving party identifies a change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice that could affect the earlier decision. The court also noted that the motions were untimely under the rule, which provided an additional basis for denial.

A party seeking to amend a complaint after judgment must first have the judgment vacated or set aside. The court also considered whether Starker had shown “excusable neglect” for missing the amendment deadline. That analysis considers prejudice to the opposing party, the length and effect of the delay, the reason for the delay and whether it was within the party’s control, and whether the party acted in good faith.

Discussion

Claim against Adamovych. Starker argued that the court overlooked law and facts supporting his claim that Adamovych acted under color of state law, which is required for liability under § 1983. The court rejected that argument. It explained that the earlier opinion had considered the joint-participation theory of state action and had not held that conspiracy was the only possible way to establish state action. The court also concluded that Starker’s allegations—even as he described them—showed only that Adamovych supplied information to police. His allegations that the information was false or connected to a fraudulently obtained temporary protection order did not change that conclusion. The court held that Starker had not met the demanding standard for reconsideration.

False-arrest claim against Detective Lodato. The court reaffirmed that the earlier dismissal was proper because Detective Lodato had at least “arguable probable cause,” meaning that reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed, and was therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The court rejected Starker’s argument that a prosecutor’s decision not to bring charges eliminated probable cause. It stated that the decision showed only that the prosecutor did not believe there was enough proof to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also rejected Starker’s arguments about inconsistencies in Adamovych’s statements, alleged reliability problems, and exculpatory information that Starker said he provided to Lodato. In the court’s view, those issues did not show that no reasonable officer could have found probable cause. Lodato knew that Adamovych had a temporary protection order against Starker and that she reported a violation of that order. The court further stated that an officer who already has probable cause generally need not investigate every possible claim of innocence before making an arrest.

The court also rejected Starker’s argument that he should have been allowed discovery before dismissal. It explained that qualified immunity protects officials from the burdens of litigation and should, when possible, be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage before discovery. The court additionally stated that Starker had not pleaded an excessive-detention claim. Even if he had, his alleged seven-hour detention before arraignment was presumptively reasonable because it did not exceed 48 hours, and he had not alleged enough facts to show unreasonable delay.

Municipal-liability claim against the City. The court acknowledged that Detective Lodato’s qualified immunity did not automatically establish that no constitutional violation occurred for purposes of a municipal-liability claim. It also acknowledged that Starker did not need to sue the individual officers to pursue a claim against the City and that the earlier opinion had not expressly addressed liability connected to Starker’s May 25, 2014 arrest by Detective Kolenda.

The court nevertheless held that reconsideration would not change the result because Starker had not adequately pleaded municipal liability. A municipal-liability claim requires facts showing, among other things, that an official municipal policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged constitutional injury. Starker did not identify an official policy that caused his injury. His reference to a New York Police Department patrol guide was insufficient because the guide required probable cause before an arrest and therefore could not be treated as a policy causing unconstitutional arrests. Starker also alleged no comparable incidents showing a persistent or widespread practice and no facts showing deliberate indifference in supervising, training, or disciplining personnel. The court therefore denied reconsideration of this issue.

Motion to amend. Because the court denied the motion to set aside or vacate the judgment, it denied Starker’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint as moot. The court added that, even if reconsideration had been granted, the amendment request would still have failed because Starker did not show excusable neglect.

Starker stated that he did not receive the September 30, 2019 decision until after the deadline because he was traveling. The court found that explanation insufficient because Starker had agreed to electronic service and was therefore on constructive notice that the decision had been entered. The court also emphasized that the motion to amend was filed more than two months after the deadline. These circumstances weighed against finding excusable neglect.

Disposition

Judge Alison J. Nathan denied Starker’s motion for reconsideration and his motion to vacate the judgment. She denied the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint as moot and stated that the motion would also be denied independently for lack of excusable neglect. The order resolved Docket Nos. 122 and 123.