Domingo Rosario Figueroa v. United States

Background

Domingo Rosario Figueroa filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure that allows a person to challenge a federal conviction or sentence. He sought to vacate his convictions on Counts Six, Seven, and Eight of the third superseding indictment and requested resentencing. The Government agreed that Count Six should be vacated but opposed relief on Counts Seven and Eight.

The eight-count indictment arose from allegations that Figueroa kidnapped two sex workers and attempted to obtain ransom from one of their pimps. Counts Six and Seven charged using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Count Six was based on kidnapping. Count Seven identified both kidnapping and making extortionate threats as possible underlying offenses. Count Eight charged possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

A jury convicted Figueroa on all eight counts in 1994. The jury’s verdict did not specify whether Count Seven rested on kidnapping, making extortionate threats, or both. At trial, the jury was instructed that it did not need to find that Figueroa knew his prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison for Count Eight.

Count Six

Figueroa relied on Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis. Those decisions invalidated the residual clause used in the definition of a “crime of violence” under § 924(c), leaving the elements clause. Under that clause, an offense qualifies only if an element requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property.

The court held that the kidnapping offense supporting Count Six did not qualify because the kidnapping statute could be violated without using force, including by “inveigling” or “decoying.” The court therefore vacated the conviction on Count Six.

Count Seven

The court found that Figueroa had not raised his challenge to Count Seven on direct appeal, so the claim was procedurally defaulted. A procedurally defaulted claim may still be considered if the petitioner shows a legally sufficient reason for the earlier omission and actual harm, or proves actual innocence. The court found that Figueroa had a sufficient reason because Johnson and Davis announced new constitutional rules after his direct appeal. It nevertheless found no actual prejudice.

The court held that the “threat to injure the person of another” form of making extortionate threats under 18 U.S.C. § 875(b), as charged here, was a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause. The court also held that Figueroa’s reference during a threatening call to his “big fuckin’ gun, machine gun” constituted use of a gun during and in relation to that crime of violence.

Although kidnapping was not a valid predicate for Count Seven, the court concluded that the extortionate-threats predicate clearly supported the conviction. The evidence proving the extortionate threats also established the gun use. Because Figueroa could not show actual prejudice from the alternative kidnapping instruction, the court did not vacate Count Seven.

Count Eight

Figueroa relied on Rehaif v. United States, which held that the Government must prove that a person charged under § 922(g) knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to a category of people barred from possessing one. The court acknowledged that the indictment did not allege, and the Government did not prove at trial, that Figueroa knew of his restricted status. The jury instruction also incorrectly stated that such knowledge was unnecessary.

The court nevertheless found the claim procedurally defaulted. It held that Figueroa had a sufficient reason for not raising the claim earlier because Rehaif overturned a longstanding interpretation of § 922(g). But the court found no actual prejudice. Figueroa had received several prison sentences exceeding one year, had spent eleven of the previous thirteen years in prison, and had stipulated to a qualifying prior conviction. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to establish that he knew he was a person barred from possessing a firearm.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that the petition was GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Count Six was VACATED. Figueroa’s claims concerning Counts Seven and Eight were DISMISSED. The court scheduled resentencing for June 26, 2020, and directed the Government to provide Figueroa’s educational and disciplinary records from the Bureau of Prisons in its sentencing submission.

Classification rationale

This is a mixed ruling. The court reached the merits of the Count Six challenge and vacated that conviction, while disposing of the Count Seven and Count Eight claims through procedural-default analysis after finding no actual prejudice.