Congregation of Ridnik v. Village of Airmont

Background

The plaintiffs—Congregation of Ridnik, Rabbi Moishe Berger, Congregation Kollel Meor Yosef, Rabbi David Ribiat, Congregation Khal Boston, Rabbi Abraham Horowitz, and Chaim Cahan—asserted claims against the Village of Airmont and the other named defendants. Their First Amended Complaint alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for free exercise, free association, equal protection, and due process; claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 for substantial burden, unequal treatment, discrimination, and exclusion and limits; and claims under the Fair Housing Act. The claims were based on Airmont’s zoning code and the defendants’ enforcement of it, which the plaintiffs alleged was intended to prevent Hasidic Jews from operating residential places of worship.

The defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The motion was fully briefed by August 30, 2019.

Standing issue

After the motion was briefed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided a related case, Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona, NY. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs in that case lacked standing to pursue several constitutional, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Fair Housing Act, and common-law claims. It reasoned that those plaintiffs had not submitted a formal proposal for their building project, applied for a permit, or engaged in other conduct invoking the challenged zoning laws, making their alleged injury conjectural.

The defendants had not moved to dismiss this case for lack of standing, and the plaintiffs had not had an opportunity to respond to a standing argument. The court explained that federal courts must independently examine their own subject-matter jurisdiction, including standing. It also explained that when a motion raises both lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction to reach the merits.

Ruling

To allow a threshold examination of its jurisdiction and give the parties an opportunity to address the Second Circuit’s intervening decision, the court denied, without prejudice, the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court did not rule on whether the plaintiffs had standing or whether their claims stated valid causes of action.

The court waived the pre-motion conference requirement and granted the defendants leave to file a new motion to dismiss. It set deadlines for the defendants’ moving papers, the plaintiffs’ opposition, and the defendants’ reply. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 44.