Thomas v. City of New York

Background

Kenya Thomas and Tyana Miller sued the City of New York and NYPD Officers Bridget Penner, David Cheesewright, Andrew Kamna, and Leonard Clarke. They asserted constitutional claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, along with New York sexual-assault and battery claims, based on a February 2, 2017 search of an apartment at 60 Moore Street in Brooklyn.

Before the search, Officers Kamna and Clarke reported two controlled drug purchases at the apartment. A confidential informant identified the seller, and Kamna obtained a no-knock warrant from the Kings County Supreme Court. The warrant authorized a search of the apartment and the seller.

Thomas lived in the apartment, and Miller was staying there. Both women testified that they were handcuffed after the search began. The search team initially had no female officers, so Penner was called to search the women. The parties sharply disputed what happened during those searches. Miller testified that she was naked and that Penner digitally penetrated her twice and touched her breasts. Thomas testified that she wore a short nightgown without underwear and that Penner directly touched her labia and clitoris. Penner testified that the women were clothed and that she did not search under their clothing.

Court’s analysis

The court first rejected the challenge to the search warrant. A warrant affidavit is presumed reliable, and the plaintiffs needed evidence of a material false statement or omission made knowingly, deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The plaintiffs identified an allegation that the seller no longer lived at the apartment but offered no evidence supporting it or undermining the reported controlled buys. The court therefore found no triable issue concerning the warrant and treated it as valid.

The court also granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ general challenge to the apartment search. It held that the search’s duration, the use of drawn guns, the handcuffing of the occupants, and the described property damage did not, on this record, show an unreasonable search or seizure. The court also found no evidence that the officers acted maliciously in causing the property damage, as required for a due-process property-damage claim.

The court reached a different conclusion about the search of Ira Thomas’s room. Miller testified that officers made her remain naked for roughly five to ten minutes while they searched the room and waited for a female officer. The court held that this account could support a finding that she was detained unclothed longer than necessary for legitimate law-enforcement purposes. Because Kamna was involved in searching the room, and might have been able to prevent the alleged harm, the court found factual issues concerning his liability and declined to grant him qualified immunity at that stage. The court granted summary judgment to Cheesewright and Clarke on this part of the claims because the plaintiffs had not shown their personal involvement or that Cheesewright knew Miller might be detained unclothed.

Regarding Miller’s search by Penner, the court held that credibility disputes belonged to a jury. Although Miller’s testimony contained inconsistencies, the court found that they did not make her account of an alleged body-cavity search impossible to believe. Summary judgment was therefore denied as to Kamna and Penner on that claim. It was granted as to Cheesewright and Clarke because the plaintiffs offered no evidence that those officers knew or should have known about an invasive search.

Regarding Thomas’s search, the court held that a constitutional claim could proceed even if the alleged conduct did not fit the labels “strip search” or “body cavity search.” Thomas’s testimony described direct skin-to-skin contact with her genitals, and the court found that her inconsistent accounts about whether she was fully clothed created a credibility issue for the jury rather than a basis for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Cheesewright, Kamna, and Clarke on this claim because the plaintiffs offered no evidence that those officers were personally involved in Thomas’s search.

The court treated the New York sexual-assault and battery claims under the same objective-reasonableness standard used for the Fourth Amendment claims. Because the constitutional claims concerning Penner’s searches survived summary judgment, the related sexual-assault and battery claims also survived.

The court granted summary judgment to the City of New York. To hold the City liable for constitutional violations, the plaintiffs needed evidence of an official policy or custom that caused a denial of constitutional rights. The plaintiffs alleged such a policy or custom but presented no supporting evidence and did not defend those claims in response to the motion.

Disposition

Judge Oetken ordered that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The parties were directed to file a joint letter within 21 days addressing possible trial dates, estimated trial length, and whether they agreed to a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Katharine Parker. The clerk was directed to close the motion.