Magid v. Waldman

Background

The court had previously ruled on Magid and Rottenberg’s petition to confirm an arbitration award entered in their favor against Waldman. That earlier ruling confirmed the award except for the portion awarding attorney’s fees to the petitioners and denied Waldman’s cross-petition to vacate the award.

Waldman moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Rule 6.3. His main argument was that the court had wrongly found that he knew about the professional relationship between the arbitrator, Yoel Tzvi Liebermann, and Rabbi Gavriel Stern. Waldman had been paying Stern to represent him in connection with the arbitration. Waldman also asked, alternatively, for limited discovery concerning when he first learned about Stern’s role with the arbitrator.

Reconsideration Standard

The court explained that reconsideration is narrowly limited. It is generally appropriate only when there has been a controlling change in the law, new evidence has become available, or the court needs to correct a clear error or prevent a serious injustice. It is not a method for rearguing issues already decided or presenting a new version of a losing argument.

Court’s Analysis

The court rejected Waldman’s claim that he lacked knowledge of Stern’s relationship with the arbitrator. The record included emails that Stern sent to both sides about deadlines and submissions, including messages signed by or sent in the name of the arbitrator. Another email stated that the arbitrator had asked Stern to direct both parties to prepare documents.

The court also relied on Waldman’s own evidence. Waldman stated that the emails led him to suspect Stern was making arguments against his interests to the arbitrator. Waldman then confronted Stern, who acknowledged that he was not acting as Waldman’s advocate before the arbitrator. During a recorded meeting, Stern described himself as having a hybrid counseling role for the arbitrator, and Waldman acknowledged that Stern was presenting himself as neutral while also acting as Waldman’s advocate.

The court concluded that Waldman knew about Stern’s working relationship with the arbitrator and had attempted to use that relationship to his advantage. The court further explained that actual knowledge was not required: a party may also waive an objection by failing to act when the party should have known of facts suggesting arbitrator bias or could have learned those facts through a limited inquiry.

The court rejected Waldman’s argument that he had no duty to object until after the arbitration award was issued. It concluded that controlling decisions required a party who knows facts possibly showing arbitrator bias or partiality to object during the arbitration; remaining silent waives the objection.

Discovery Request and Disposition

The court declined to authorize discovery. It found the request untimely and without merit because the existing record—including evidence Waldman himself submitted—showed that he knew, or at least should have known, about Stern’s relationship with the arbitrator. The court also noted that Waldman would have had access to evidence about his own knowledge.

Judge Furman denied Waldman’s motion for reconsideration. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate ECF Nos. 44 and 45.