Young v. United States

Background

Davon Young filed an amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal procedure that allows a person convicted in federal court to challenge the conviction or sentence after direct appeal. He sought to add a claim concerning Count 15, a conviction for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. Young argued that the conviction was invalid because the indictment and trial did not establish that he knew he had been convicted of such a crime. The government conceded that this knowledge had not been charged or proved at Young’s 2011 trial, which occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States.

Young also continued to pursue a challenge to his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He argued that Hobbs Act robbery could qualify as the required predicate offense only under a statutory provision later held unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Davis. The opinion states that Young acknowledged this argument was foreclosed by United States v. Hill, which held that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under a different statutory provision.

Rehaif claim and relation back

The court held that Young’s proposed Rehaif claim was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Young argued that the claim should be treated as filed when his earlier amended petition was filed because both claims involved the same gun and the same date. This is known as “relation back,” which permits a later amendment when it arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence described in the original pleading.

The court rejected that argument. Applying Mayle v. Felix, it held that the earlier Johnson claim concerned the legal question whether Hobbs Act robbery was a qualifying crime of violence under § 924(c), while the proposed Rehaif claim concerned Young’s knowledge of his status as a convicted felon for purposes of § 922(g). Because the claims involved different legal and factual questions, they did not share the required common core of operative facts. The court therefore denied the motion to amend and dismissed the new claim as untimely.

Procedural default

The court further ruled that, even if the amendment related back and were timely, the Rehaif claim was procedurally barred because Young had not raised it on direct appeal. Procedural default generally prevents a person from using a later collateral challenge to raise a ground that was omitted from the direct appeal. An exception may apply if the person shows a legally sufficient reason for the omission and resulting prejudice, or proves actual innocence.

The court found that Young had not shown the required reason. It rejected his argument that raising the claim on direct appeal would have been futile and concluded that the claim’s legal basis was not so unavailable at the time that its omission could be excused. The court therefore dismissed the Rehaif claim alternatively as procedurally defaulted.

Other ruling and disposition

The court dismissed the Johnson challenge to Young’s § 924(c) convictions as foreclosed by Hill. It also found that Young had not made the substantial showing required for a certificate of appealability, so no certificate issued. The Clerk was directed to docket the order in both listed cases, terminate the specified docket entries, and close the civil case.