Thurmond v. Thomas-Walsh

Background

Kevin Thurmond, who was incarcerated at Woodbourne Correctional Facility and represented himself, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Avion Thomas-Walsh and Frederick Bernstein were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliated against him for filing grievances in violation of the First Amendment. Judge Karas previously dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim. The remaining claim was the First Amendment retaliation claim.

The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). They argued that the applicable limitations period ended on January 8, 2018, and that Thurmond’s complaint was not filed by then. Although the complaint was dated January 8, 2018, the defendants argued that Thurmond did not present it for prison security clearance until January 9, 2018 and paid postage on January 10, 2018.

Court’s Analysis

A Rule 12(c) motion is evaluated under the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). At that stage, the court generally considers the pleadings, documents attached to them, documents incorporated into them, documents integral to the complaint, and matters subject to judicial notice.

For a self-represented prisoner, a complaint is treated as filed when the prisoner delivers it to prison officials for mailing. The defendants relied on a January 9, 2018 “Disbursement or Refund Request” form and the declaration of Brenda Clark. The court found that the disbursement form showed only that legal postage was deducted from Thurmond’s account on January 9; it did not identify what was mailed or when Thurmond delivered the complaint to prison officials.

The court also declined to consider the Clark Declaration on the Rule 12(c) motion because it was not part of the materials properly considered at that stage. The court added that, even if it considered the declaration, it did not answer the key factual question: when Thurmond gave his complaint to prison officials.

The court assumed for purposes of the motion that the limitations period ended on January 8, 2018. Accepting the complaint’s allegations as required at the pleading stage, the court concluded that the First Amendment retaliation claim was not shown to be time barred. Without discovery, the court could not determine whether the complaint was untimely.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The First Amendment retaliation claim shall proceed to discovery. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion and mail Thurmond a copy of the order.