Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority

Background

Robert Mercer, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). Mercer resides in a property owned and maintained by NYCHA. A New York City Civil Court order required NYCHA to repair and inspect mold and plaster problems in his bathroom and kitchen resulting from a pipe leak. Several repair appointments did not occur because of miscommunications, and Mercer was not contacted to reschedule them. NYCHA later inspected the apartment and found mold and water damage. Mercer visited a hospital and was diagnosed with mild intermittent asthma without complications.

Mercer alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended (FHA), and 24 C.F.R. § 5.703(f), a Department of Housing and Urban Development regulation requiring housing areas and components to be free of certain health and safety hazards, including mold and improper ventilation. The repairs were later completed.

Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss

NYCHA moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court denied the Rule 12(b)(1) request. Although the federal claims were inadequately pleaded, the FHA claim was not so implausible or plainly meritless that the court lacked power to hear it.

The court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) request. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal means that the complaint does not allege enough facts to support a legally valid claim, even assuming the pleaded facts are true. The court gave Mercer’s self-represented complaint special consideration but explained that it could not create facts that Mercer had not alleged.

FHA Claim

The court understood Mercer to be asserting a disability-discrimination claim based on NYCHA’s alleged failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A) and § 3604(f)(3)(B). A reasonable-accommodation claim requires allegations that the plaintiff has a qualifying handicap, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known about it, the accommodation may be necessary for equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling, the requested accommodation was reasonable, and the defendant refused to provide it.

The court held that Mercer had not adequately alleged the first two requirements. First, the FHA defines a handicap as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. The complaint did not explain what major life activity was impaired or how Mercer’s asthma substantially limited it. The court noted that the diagnosis described mild intermittent asthma without complications and that asthma does not automatically substantially limit a major life activity.

Second, the complaint did not allege that NYCHA knew or had reason to know about Mercer’s asthma before the alleged delay in mold repairs. The complaint stated that NYCHA identified and notified Mercer about mold, and that Mercer was diagnosed with asthma afterward, but it did not allege that Mercer notified NYCHA of the condition or explain how NYCHA otherwise learned about it. Because the first two requirements were inadequately alleged, the court did not address the remaining requirements.

The court also noted that Mercer had not alleged claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act. It stated that even if the complaint were read to include those claims, they would fail for the same reasons as the FHA claim.

Regulation Claim

The court dismissed Mercer’s claim based solely on 24 C.F.R. § 5.703(f). It ruled that this regulation does not create an enforceable private right of action for an individual. The court therefore held that the complaint did not state a federal claim for relief under that regulation.

State-Law Claims and Amendment

The court stated that Mercer’s allegations might support state-law habitability or common-law tort claims. Because the federal claims were not adequately pleaded, however, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state-law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is a court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. The state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice, and the court advised Mercer that they must be brought in state court.

The court dismissed the regulation claim with prejudice because there was no legally cognizable private right of action under the regulation. The court also stated that a second amended complaint would not ordinarily be required because the identified deficiencies appeared incurable. Still, Mercer was allowed, but not required, to file a letter by February 12, 2021, identifying additional facts that could plausibly show that his condition significantly impaired a major life activity and that NYCHA knew about the condition, how it learned of it, and when.

Disposition

Judge Lorna G. Schofield’s conclusion states that NYCHA’s motion to dismiss was granted. Read together with the court’s specific rulings, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was denied, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted, the regulation claim was dismissed with prejudice, and any state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice. The court directed the clerk to terminate the pending motion and mail Mercer a copy of the opinion.