Cutts v. Miller

Background

Aljulah Cutts sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his New York State convictions and sentences. He was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and first-degree robbery for the July 29, 2009 strangulation death of Felix Brinkmann during a robbery and burglary in New York. He received concurrent prison terms of 25 years to life on the murder counts and 15 years on the robbery count, followed by five years of post-release supervision.

Cutts raised several claims. He argued that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining cell-site location information (CSLI) without a warrant supported by probable cause; that his lawyer was ineffective for not making that challenge; that his videotaped statement violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he had asked about getting a lawyer and was too exhausted or confused to speak voluntarily; that the trial court improperly excluded photographs from his brother Hasib Cutts’s van; and that the trial court improperly refused to remove prospective juror Julie Ford for cause.

Cell-Site Location Information

A state judge authorized investigators to obtain historical and real-time CSLI under the Stored Communications Act. The order stated that there was probable cause that the location information was relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. Police used real-time CSLI the next day to locate and arrest Cutts.

The court did not decide whether obtaining the CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it applied the rule from Stone v. Powell, under which a state prisoner generally cannot obtain federal relief based on an unconstitutional search or seizure when the state provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue. The court found that New York provided adequate suppression procedures and that Cutts had not shown an “unconscionable breakdown” in those procedures. Cutts had challenged his lineup and post-arrest statements in state court but had not challenged the acquisition of his CSLI. The court concluded that the later decision in Carpenter v. United States and the state court’s refusal to apply it retroactively did not show a breakdown in the state process.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington: a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that the deficiency created a reasonable probability of a different result. Federal review under Section 2254 and Strickland is especially deferential when a state court already rejected the claim.

The court held that Cutts’s lawyer was not ineffective for failing to anticipate Carpenter, which was decided six years after Cutts’s trial. Before Carpenter, courts disagreed about the showing required to obtain CSLI, and the court stated that requiring a probable-cause warrant was not a foregone conclusion. The court also held that Cutts could not show a reasonable probability of a different verdict because substantial other evidence connected him to the crime, including his written and videotaped admissions and surveillance footage.

Statements During Interrogation

The court held that the state courts reasonably concluded that Cutts did not make an unequivocal request for counsel. His question about whether he should have an attorney was treated as ambiguous, and the prosecutor explained that he had to decide whether to have a lawyer before Cutts agreed to continue speaking.

The court also rejected Cutts’s claim that exhaustion, lethargy, or confusion made his statement involuntary. Considering the circumstances of the interrogation, the court concluded that Cutts voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The court relied on the state courts’ factual findings, which are generally presumed correct under Section 2254 unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

Excluded Photographs

Cutts wanted to introduce photographs of dead chickens and a crow inside Hasib Cutts’s van to support his arguments that Hasib was more culpable and that Cutts incriminated himself because he feared Hasib. The state appellate court held that the trial court reasonably limited this evidence because it had little or no probative value.

The federal court held that Cutts’s constitutional version of this claim was procedurally barred because he did not present it as a federal constitutional objection at trial. The court also found that Cutts had not shown cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice that would excuse the default. Alternatively, the court concluded that excluding the photographs did not make the trial fundamentally unfair and that the evidence would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result.

Juror Challenge

Cutts challenged the trial court’s refusal to remove Julie Ford for cause. Ford’s husband had been a former prosecutor, but she gave assurances that she could be fair and impartial. Cutts used a peremptory challenge to remove her, and she did not sit on the jury.

The court held that the loss of a peremptory challenge is not, by itself, a federal constitutional violation when the jury that sits is impartial. Cutts did not claim that the resulting jury included a biased juror. The court therefore rejected his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims concerning Ford.

Disposition

The court dismissed Cutts’s Section 2254 petition. It did not reach the government’s alternative argument that obtaining the CSLI was lawful, but it rejected the remaining claims on the grounds described above. The court denied a certificate of appealability because Cutts had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied, and it certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.