Carrasco v. Miller

Background

Jose E. Carrasco, representing himself, filed a petition asking the federal court to grant relief from his New York state convictions for second-degree murder and first-degree robbery. Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses recommended denying the petition in full. Carrasco filed objections, and the district court reviewed the challenged portions of the recommendation independently and, as a precaution, reviewed the entire recommendation.

Claims and analysis

Inconsistent verdicts. Carrasco argued that his conviction for intentional murder was inconsistent with his acquittals on first-degree murder and felony murder. The court held that inconsistent jury verdicts are not a basis for federal habeas relief because federal law does not protect a state defendant from inconsistent verdicts.

Fourth Amendment claims. Carrasco challenged the officers’ entry into his home, the seizure of clothing and a knife, and the finding of probable cause for his arrest. The court explained that federal habeas review generally is unavailable for an alleged search-and-seizure violation when the state courts provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate it. Carrasco had received a six-day suppression hearing and subsequent state-court review, which the court said did not show a breakdown in that process.

The court also reviewed the state courts’ conclusions under the deferential standard governing federal review of state convictions. It agreed that Jeanette Diaz had apparent authority to consent to the officers’ entry and search. The court relied on the facts that she lived in the apartment, the bedroom was shared and unlocked, she gave the officers Carrasco’s clothing, signed a consent form, and invited them to inspect the bedroom. The court further agreed that Carrasco lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shared bedroom and the plastic bag. It also found no reason to reject the state court’s conclusion that the arrest was supported by probable cause based on the physical evidence and other information.

Ineffective assistance of counsel. Carrasco challenged the effectiveness of his state appellate counsel, apparently relying on the fact that counsel’s arguments were unsuccessful. Applying the standard from Strickland v. Washington, the court agreed that counsel’s performance was not deficient and did not prejudice the defense. The court emphasized that an unsuccessful legal argument does not by itself establish constitutionally ineffective assistance.

Confrontation Clause claim. Carrasco challenged the admission of evidence involving DNA testing without testimony from every analyst involved. The court first held that the claim was procedurally defaulted because Carrasco did not raise it in his application for leave to appeal and did not show a legally sufficient reason for that omission or resulting prejudice. The court then addressed the claim alternatively on the merits. It concluded that the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law. The Supreme Court had not held that the Confrontation Clause requires testimony from every analyst involved in creating or comparing a DNA profile, nor that the unsworn, uncertified notes at issue were testimonial statements.

Health conditions and extensions

Carrasco told the court about several health conditions. The court had granted him additional time to file objections because of those conditions, but concluded that the conditions did not excuse his failure to present a meritorious claim or objection.

Disposition

Judge John P. Cronan adopted Judge Moses’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The court denied Carrasco’s habeas petition, directed the Clerk to mail him a copy of the order, and closed the case.