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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Feb. 1, 2021

Bryant v. Miller

Judge
Kenneth Karas
Docket
7:18-cv-10198
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
11
Civil RightsSection 1983First AmendmentMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Bryant v. Capra, Judge Karas granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Bryant’s prison-hair claims with prejudice.

Who this affects

Thomas Bryant’s claims against Michael Capra and Ms. Hickson were dismissed with prejudice, and the case was closed.

What happened

Thomas Bryant, an incarcerated atheist, claimed that prison officials Michael Capra and Ms. Hickson violated his rights by requiring him to secure his floor-length dreadlocks or wear a religious hair covering in the prison yard. He brought claims under the First and Eighth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The court found that Bryant still had not plausibly alleged that wearing his hair up was part of his atheistic practice or that the prison rule substantially burdened his religious exercise. It also rejected his Establishment Clause and equal-protection theories and found that his lack of yard access resulted from his own choice rather than unconstitutional action by Defendants.

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Bryant’s claims with prejudice. The court said the amended complaint repeated the earlier pleading’s problems, declined to address Defendants’ arguments about personal involvement and qualified immunity, and directed the Clerk to close the case.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Bryant v. Miller · No. 7:18-cv-10198
Judge
Kenneth Karas
Date
Feb. 1, 2021

Background

Thomas Bryant, who was incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility and represented himself, sued Superintendent Michael Capra and Ms. Hickson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Bryant alleged that Hickson told him he could not wear his dreadlocks wrapped up without securing them unless he also wore a religious hair covering. He claimed Capra later upheld the resulting grievance decision.

Bryant described himself as an atheist with sincerely held beliefs centered on being free from religious beliefs and practices. He alleged that the restriction prevented him from wearing his floor-length dreadlocks in the prison yard in a clean and hygienic manner consistent with his beliefs. He claimed that he stopped using the yard and suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries.

Bryant asserted claims under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Eighth Amendment. He also alleged a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.

Defendants’ Motion

Defendants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim for relief. They argued that Bryant had not adequately alleged their personal involvement, had not stated First Amendment, equal-protection, or Eighth Amendment claims, and that they were entitled to qualified immunity. They also argued that the claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the third amended complaint did not fix the deficiencies identified in its January 2020 opinion. For the Free Exercise and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims, Bryant still did not allege that wearing his hair up without a religious covering, or with a nonreligious covering, was part of his atheistic practice. The court therefore found that he had not plausibly alleged a substantial burden on religious exercise.

The court also concluded that Bryant’s new allegations did not change its earlier conclusion that the prison directive’s accommodation of religions requiring head coverings did not violate the Establishment Clause. The court treated the issue as one properly analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause. It again rejected the equal-protection claim as derivative and duplicative of the First Amendment claim and found that Bryant was not similarly situated to inmates who wore dreadlocks for religious reasons.

For the Eighth Amendment claim, the court found that Bryant had not alleged a constitutionally protected interest in wearing floor-length dreadlocks in the challenged manner. It therefore concluded that his failure to use the exercise yard resulted from his own choice rather than Defendants’ conduct, even though he alleged that this caused him to lose access to meaningful physical exercise.

The court also stated that prison staff’s alleged failure to follow prison regulations was not actionable under § 1983. Because the third amended complaint’s factual allegations were materially identical to those in the earlier complaint, the court applied the law-of-the-case doctrine and dismissed the claims for the same reasons previously given.

Disposition

The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Bryant’s claims with prejudice. It did not reach Defendants’ arguments concerning personal involvement or qualified immunity. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion, mail Bryant a copy of the opinion and order, and close the case.

The authoritative version

Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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