McFall v. United States

Background

Raoul McFall was sentenced on November 16, 2012, to 180 months in prison after pleading guilty to a drug-conspiracy offense and to possessing, carrying, and using, and aiding and abetting the possession, carrying, and use of, a firearm that was discharged in connection with drug trafficking. The sentence consisted of 60 months on the drug count and 120 consecutive months on the firearm count, followed by four years of supervised release.

McFall’s plea agreement stated that he would not bring a direct appeal or a collateral challenge, including a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to any sentence within or below the stipulated guideline range of 190 to 207 months. During the plea hearing, McFall confirmed that he understood he was giving up the right to challenge a sentence of 207 months or less. The Second Circuit dismissed his appeal based on the waiver and granted the government’s request for summary affirmance of the conviction.

McFall, representing himself, filed a § 2255 motion seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. He raised four grounds: an insufficient factual basis for the firearm conviction; credit against supervised release for extra time served on that conviction under the First Step Act of 2018; a challenge based on United States v. Davis; and ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s alleged failure to object to an incorrect presentence investigation report.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the plea-agreement waiver was enforceable. It found that McFall knowingly and voluntarily accepted the waiver because the plea record showed that he had discussed the agreement with counsel, was competent to plead guilty, had no questions about the plea, and understood that he was giving up the right to challenge his sentence. Because his sentence was below the stipulated range, the waiver applied.

The court found no applicable exception to the waiver. It noted that McFall did not show that the sentence was based on an unconstitutional factor, that the government breached the plea agreement, or that the court failed to explain the sentence. His ineffective-assistance claim concerned sentencing rather than the plea agreement or the decision to appeal, so it did not avoid the waiver. The court also rejected McFall’s reliance on Class v. United States because, unlike the agreement in Class, McFall’s agreement expressly barred collateral challenges under § 2255. The court explained that a later favorable change in the law, including Davis, does not by itself invalidate an express appeal or collateral-attack waiver.

The court separately addressed § 2255’s one-year statute of limitations. It stated that McFall’s conviction became final on September 15, 2014. The court concluded that all claims other than the Davis claim were untimely. It explained that § 2255(h), which concerns second or successive motions, did not establish timeliness for McFall’s first § 2255 motion. The Davis claim was timely only if it relied on Davis’s specific ruling concerning the vague residual clause of § 924(c); even then, the claim was barred by the plea-agreement waiver. If McFall sought to extend Davis to a different § 924(c) provision, the court stated that argument was untimely.

Disposition

Judge Victor Marrero ordered that McFall’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under § 2255 was DENIED. The court expressly stated that it did not address the merits because the claims were barred by the plea-agreement waiver, the statute of limitations, or both.