Vyrkin v. Triboro Bridge & Tunnel Authority
- Stewart Aaron
- 1:18-cv-12106
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 25
In Vyrkin v. Triboro, Judge Koeltl partly denied summary judgment, allowing only Vyrkin’s excessive-force claim against Officer Cabrera to continue.
The ruling leaves only Vladimir Vyrkin’s federal excessive-force claim against Officer Edwin Cabrera pending; the Triboro Bridge and Tunnel Authority was dismissed, and all other claims were resolved for the defendants.
What happened
Vladimir Vyrkin, who represented himself, sued the Triboro Bridge and Tunnel Authority and Officer Edwin Cabrera over his arrest at the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge. He claimed false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, assault, battery, and other state and federal violations after he reversed near a school bus, refused requests for his license and registration, and was arrested.
The court ruled that Cabrera had probable cause to arrest Vyrkin and begin the criminal proceedings, so the false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims failed. The court also rejected the state-law claims, claims against the Authority based on its policies or supervision, and other claims. But disputed evidence about the handcuffing and transportation prevented judgment without a trial on Vyrkin’s federal excessive-force claim against Cabrera.
Judge John G. Koeltl granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims except Vyrkin’s federal excessive-force claim against Cabrera, as to which he denied the motion. The Authority was dismissed from the case.
The detailed version
- Vyrkin v. Triboro Bridge & Tunnel Authority · No. 1:18-cv-12106
- Stewart Aaron
- Mar. 2, 2021
Background
Vladimir Vyrkin, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the Triboro Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) and Officer Edwin Cabrera. He alleged claims under New York law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, arising from his arrest at the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge. The claims included false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, assault, battery, negligent hiring and supervision, and related constitutional theories.
Vyrkin entered toll-plaza lane 12, where a sign warned drivers not to back up. When a vehicle stopped ahead of him, he honked and reversed toward a school bus. Cabrera, a TBTA Bridge and Tunnel Officer, told him to stop and repeatedly requested his license and registration. Vyrkin did not comply and refused to move his vehicle. After Sergeant Hilda Ellis arrived and also requested the documents, she authorized Cabrera to arrest Vyrkin.
Vyrkin was handcuffed, taken to a TBTA building, and later transported to the 45th Precinct. He alleged that the handcuffs were excessively tight and that he was chained to the floor of the police vehicle without seats. He also alleged that walking over a curb caused substantial leg pain. He was issued summonses for unsafe backing, failure to comply with a lawful order, and obstruction of governmental administration, and he was later acquitted of all counts.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to decide claims without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over an important fact.
Claims Against Officer Cabrera
False arrest. The court held that Cabrera had probable cause—reasonable grounds based on known facts—to arrest Vyrkin. Cabrera saw Vyrkin reverse beside a sign prohibiting backing up and toward a school bus, which reasonably appeared to violate New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1211(a). The court also found probable cause to believe that Vyrkin failed to comply with lawful orders and obstructed governmental administration. Because probable cause is a complete defense to false arrest, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the false-arrest claims under New York law and the Fourth Amendment.
Malicious prosecution. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the malicious-prosecution claims under New York law and § 1983. It found probable cause for the proceedings based on the unsafe-backing, failure-to-comply, and obstruction charges. The court also found that Vyrkin had not produced evidence that Cabrera acted with actual malice.
Excessive force. The court denied summary judgment on Vyrkin’s federal excessive-force claim against Cabrera. The claim concerned the manner and extent of the handcuffing, including the initial handcuffing, handcuffing at the TBTA building, and the method of transporting Vyrkin to the precinct. The court found disputed material facts about the extent of Vyrkin’s injuries and whether the force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that the alleged offenses were not particularly serious and that the defendants had not shown that Vyrkin posed a danger, resisted arrest, or attempted to flee.
Qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect a public official from damages when the official did not violate clearly established law or reasonably believed the conduct was lawful. The court declined to resolve qualified immunity on summary judgment because factual disputes prevented it from deciding whether Cabrera’s conduct was objectively reasonable.
Claims Against the TBTA
The court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims against the TBTA. It dismissed the state-law tort claims because Vyrkin served his notice of claim after the required 90-day period, except that his malicious-prosecution notice was timely. The malicious-prosecution claim nevertheless failed because of probable cause and the absence of evidence of malice.
The court also dismissed Vyrkin’s § 1983 claim against the TBTA under the municipal-policy rule commonly associated with Monell. Vyrkin did not produce evidence that a TBTA policy or custom caused a constitutional injury, or evidence about the TBTA’s hiring, training, or supervision practices. The court likewise dismissed the negligent-hiring and supervision claims because Vyrkin did not provide evidence that the TBTA knew or should have known that Cabrera had a relevant propensity or that the TBTA negligently hired him.
Other Claims
The court granted summary judgment dismissing the alleged fair-trial claim because Vyrkin raised it for the first time in his opposition brief rather than in the complaint. It dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the notice of claim was untimely and because Vyrkin could not establish the required elements. It also dismissed the § 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment because the complaint contained no supporting allegations or evidence.
Disposition
The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Vyrkin’s § 1983 excessive-force claim against Officer Cabrera alone. It granted the motion with respect to all other claims and dismissed the TBTA from the case.
Read the full 25-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.