Dunham v. Philip Lobello

Background

Jermaine Dunham brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing lawsuits for violations of constitutional rights by people acting under state authority, against the City of New York and Police Officers Lamar Oliver and Philip Lobello. He alleged excessive force, malicious prosecution, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and municipal liability against the City based on its policies or customs.

The events began on February 14, 2008, when Officer Lobello, accompanied by his police dog Rocco, was searching for suspects in an armed robbery. Lobello encountered Dunham, asked for his identification, and directed him to place his hands against a van. The parties disputed what happened next. Dunham said Lobello stopped him from leaving and released Rocco without warning; the dog bit his arm, head, and neck for approximately two minutes while he was lying in the street and not resisting. The defendants said Dunham tried to leave, struggled with Lobello, reached toward an object Lobello believed was a gun, and was bitten while Lobello was trying to subdue him. It was undisputed that Lobello recovered a loaded semi-automatic handgun from Dunham’s chest area.

Dunham was charged with, among other offenses, robbery, weapon possession, and resisting arrest. A jury acquitted him of the robbery charges but convicted him of resisting arrest and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. He later pursued this civil action. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence leaves any factual dispute that a jury must decide. Dunham separately moved to seal medical records, grand-jury transcripts, and a document designated confidential under a protective order.

Excessive Force

The court analyzed the excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable seizures. The question was whether the force used was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, including the seriousness of the suspected crime, the threat posed by the person, and whether he was resisting or fleeing.

The court held that genuine disputes of material fact prevented summary judgment. Although Dunham was suspected of an armed robbery and the court held that he could not relitigate whether he reached for a weapon, those findings did not resolve whether the force used after he was subdued was reasonable. A reasonable jury could find that Rocco continued biting Dunham after he no longer posed an immediate threat or resisted arrest. The court therefore denied summary judgment on the excessive-force claim.

The court also rejected qualified immunity for Officer Lobello at this stage. Qualified immunity can protect an official when the official did not violate clearly established law or reasonably believed the conduct was lawful. Because the parties’ accounts created disputes about the force used and its reasonableness, the court held that qualified immunity could not be decided as a matter of law.

Malicious Prosecution

The court granted summary judgment on Dunham’s malicious-prosecution claim. Probable cause is a complete defense to that claim. The victim of the armed robbery identified Dunham as the perpetrator, and the court concluded that this identification independently established probable cause to prosecute, apart from the grand-jury indictment. The court therefore did not reach whether there was a factual dispute about the evidence presented to the grand jury.

Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

The court also granted summary judgment on the deliberate-indifference claim. The defendants did not dispute that Dunham’s injuries were sufficiently serious for the claim’s objective requirement. But the court found no evidence that either officer intentionally imposed the condition or recklessly failed to take reasonable steps to reduce the medical risk. The court found that emergency medical services were called and treated Dunham at the scene before taking him to the hospital. Because the court found that Dunham received prompt medical treatment, it granted summary judgment on this claim.

Municipal Liability

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. The court held that summary judgment could not be granted on Dunham’s municipal-liability claims because the excessive-force claim remained unresolved and presented factual disputes. The court continued to bifurcate those claims, meaning it kept them separate from the individual-officer claims, and stayed discovery on them.

Other Rulings and Disposition

The court granted Dunham’s unopposed motion to seal the specified medical records, grand-jury transcripts, and confidential document, while ordering redacted versions to be filed. In its conclusion, the court denied summary judgment on Dunham’s first, fourth, and fifth claims; granted summary judgment on his second and third claims; granted the motion to seal; continued the stay of municipal-liability discovery; and ordered the parties to file a joint status report within 30 days.