Truitt v. Salisbury Bank and Trust Company

Background

William Gunnar Truitt sued Salisbury Bank and Trust Company and Salisbury Bancorp, Inc. He alleged that the defendants retaliated against him and wrongfully terminated his employment because of his political activities, in violation of New York Labor Law § 201-d. The statute includes running for public office within its definition of political activities.

Truitt began working for the defendants on February 26, 2018. In April 2018, he announced that he intended to campaign for the New York State Assembly. The defendants rejected his request to serve as an Assemblymember while keeping his Bank job, citing the time commitment and salary associated with the position. The defendants told him he would have to choose between continuing his employment and serving as an Assemblymember. Truitt then wrote that he had decided to continue his campaign and stopped working for the defendants. He characterized this as a forced resignation, or constructive discharge.

The defendants later moved for summary judgment, which is judgment without a trial when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party. On July 21, 2020, the court granted that motion, finding that no rational juror could conclude that Truitt had been constructively discharged. The court also stated that, even assuming a constructive discharge, Truitt could not rebut the defendants’ explanation that campaigning for and serving as an Assemblymember would interfere with his Bank duties.

Motion for Reconsideration

Truitt moved for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court explained that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally available only when the court overlooked controlling law or important information, and that it is not an opportunity to present new theories or take a second chance at arguments already rejected.

Truitt argued that the court had relied improperly on his failure to respond to the defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement. The court clarified that it treated the defendants’ factual assertions as admitted only to the extent they were supported by the record and that it independently reviewed the entire record.

Truitt also argued that the court improperly considered evidence favorable to the defendants and testimony from interested witnesses. The court rejected that argument, stating that it was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Truitt but that the record contained very little evidence contradicting the defendants’ factual assertions.

Alleged Factual Errors

The court addressed five examples of factual findings that Truitt claimed were incorrect. It agreed that the defendants had told him he needed to make a decision about continuing his campaign, but found that those statements did not show that he was forced to resign.

The court reaffirmed that Truitt resigned when he chose to pursue the Assembly position and stopped working for the Bank. It distinguished that factual conclusion from the legal question of whether the circumstances amounted to constructive discharge. The court again concluded that they did not, because the circumstances did not rise to the level of the hostile or coercive conduct typically required for constructive discharge.

The court also upheld its finding that serving as an Assemblymember would require approximately 60 days in Albany. It relied on the 2018 legislative calendar, which listed 59 planned session days, as well as the demands of Truitt’s Bank position. The court rejected Truitt’s argument that shorter sessions and available leave would make the two positions feasible to hold at the same time.

The court further found that Truitt had testified that no one told him his employment would be terminated whether or not he ran for office. Finally, it reaffirmed that Arthur Bassin, a Bank board member and contributor to the campaign of Truitt’s political opponent, was not involved in the actual decision-making process concerning Truitt’s request for outside employment. The court stated that Bassin’s expression of an opinion to a Bank executive did not establish that Bassin made or participated in that decision.

Ruling

The court reaffirmed its finding that Truitt was not constructively discharged. It also reiterated that, even if he had been discharged, he could not rebut the defendants’ stated reason: the time commitment involved in campaigning for and holding office as an Assemblymember would interfere with his ability to work for the Bank.

Judge Roman denied Truitt’s motion for reconsideration. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 54.