Kaplan v. County of Orange

Background

Frederick Kaplan sued the County of Orange, the Town of Warwick, public officials and police officers, Access: Supports for Living Inc., Laura Altieri, and Jane Doe. He alleged that, on March 13, 2019, Altieri gave County mental-health officials false information suggesting that Kaplan needed immediate mental-health care because he posed a danger to himself or others. A County official then issued a removal order under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.45.

Kaplan alleged that Altieri delivered the order to Town police and urged them to remove him. He claimed that Altieri, Doe, and the Town police officers entered his property, forced him to the ground, handcuffed and arrested him, and transported him to a hospital, where he was held involuntarily for about six hours.

Kaplan asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute that allows lawsuits for violations of constitutional rights by state actors. His claims included unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, excessive force, and failure to intervene. He also asserted New York claims for trespass, assault, battery, and false imprisonment.

Claims Against the Access Defendants

The Access Defendants moved to dismiss Kaplan’s federal claims against Altieri and Doe. The court ruled that Kaplan had not plausibly alleged that Altieri and Doe were state actors, which is required for a claim under § 1983.

The court considered three ways private conduct may be treated as state action: government coercion, a sufficiently close relationship or joint activity with the government, and performance of a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the government. It held that New York’s Mental Hygiene Law created a legal framework for mental-health removals but did not compel or significantly encourage Altieri’s conduct. The court also held that the County’s agreement with Access Inc., without more, did not create the required close relationship with the government. Finally, reporting conduct to the government, requesting police assistance, and being present during the seizure did not amount to a function reserved exclusively to the government. The court said the complaint did not explain how Altieri or Doe participated in the seizure beyond being present.

The court therefore dismissed Counts Two, Three, and Five against Altieri and Doe. Because it dismissed the federal claims against those defendants, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—meaning authority to hear related state claims—over Kaplan’s state-law claims against Altieri and Doe and dismissed those claims without prejudice. The court also dismissed the state-law claims against Access Inc. without prejudice and did not reach the respondeat-superior theory against that company.

Claims Against the Town Defendants

The Town Defendants moved to dismiss the federal claims against the individual officers and the state-law claims against the officers and the Town.

Unreasonable seizure

The court denied the motion as to Count Two. It held that an involuntary mental-health hospitalization is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and generally requires probable cause. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court could consider only the complaint’s allegations. The complaint did not provide enough information about what Altieri observed, what the removal order contained, what information the officers received, or what the officers themselves observed before taking Kaplan into custody.

Because the court could not decide from the complaint whether the officers had probable cause, it also could not decide whether they had “arguable probable cause” sufficient for qualified immunity, a protection that can shield government officials from damages when a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was lawful. The court likewise declined to dismiss the claim based on the removal order, New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.45, or the state-law immunity provision in § 9.59.

False imprisonment and excessive force

The court denied the motion as to Count Three. It held that Kaplan adequately alleged that the officers intended to confine him, that he did not consent, that he knew he was confined, and that the confinement was not shown at this stage to be legally privileged.

The court also denied the motion as to Count Four. Kaplan alleged that the officers forced him to the ground and sat on his back to prevent him from standing. The court held that the complaint did not establish that this force was objectively reasonable because it lacked facts about the danger facing the officers or whether Kaplan resisted or tried to evade arrest.

State-law claims

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the individual Town Defendants and the Town because those claims arose from the same events as the federal claims. It denied the motion as to Count Six, the trespass claim, because the complaint adequately alleged an intentional and unjustified entry onto Kaplan’s property and adequately pleaded the Town’s possible vicarious liability for its officers’ conduct.

The court denied the motion as to Counts Seven and Eight, the assault and battery claims, because it allowed the related excessive-force claim to proceed. It also denied the motion as to Count Nine, the state-law false-imprisonment claim, because the federal false-imprisonment claim survived and the court could not determine from the complaint that the officers were protected by the state immunity provision.

Disposition

The court’s final order states that the Access Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted and the Town Defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied. The opinion does not state that the dismissed federal claims were dismissed with or without prejudice. It expressly states that the state-law claims dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction were dismissed without prejudice.