Grytsyk v. Morales

Background

Petro Grytsyk alleged that he had sold his artwork on a Manhattan sidewalk since 2010. He claimed that Officer Anthony Morales arrested him on April 18, 2016, after Grytsyk objected to how a summons was issued to Grytsyk’s wife and protested Lieutenant Sujat Khan’s order to close his display. Morales charged Grytsyk with obstructing governmental administration and disorderly conduct. Grytsyk alleged that Morales handcuffed him tightly enough to aggravate a pre-existing right-hand condition and that Khan directed officers to seize Grytsyk’s artwork and displays.

Grytsyk further alleged that police officers issued him numerous summonses relating to his street vending between 2016 and 2020, and that the summonses were dismissed or never filed. He alleged that officers issued twenty-one summonses between June 1 and October 14, 2018, as part of a campaign to harass him and interfere with his business. He also alleged that officers seized and damaged artwork on August 14, 2018. The Times Square Alliance was named as a defendant, but Grytsyk voluntarily dismissed his claims against it without prejudice, making its motion to dismiss moot.

The City and the individual officers moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in Grytsyk’s favor for purposes of the motion.

Claims That Survived

The court denied the motion as to Grytsyk’s false-arrest claim against Khan and Morales. The court held that the complaint did not establish probable cause, or even arguable probable cause for qualified-immunity purposes, based on obstructing governmental administration, disorderly conduct, or the vending regulations. The alleged interference with the issuance of the summons to Grytsyk’s wife consisted only of verbal statements. The complaint also did not show that Grytsyk’s protest of the order to close his display created the physical interference or other hazard required for an obstruction arrest. The court further concluded that the record did not establish whether Grytsyk was vending during a prohibited time, because the 1:15 p.m. notation on the summonses might have reflected the time the summonses were completed rather than the time of the alleged offense.

The court also allowed Grytsyk’s malicious-prosecution claim against Khan and Morales to proceed. The criminal charges from the April 2016 arrest had been dismissed on speedy-trial grounds. Applying binding Second Circuit precedent, the court held that a dismissal for lack of timely prosecution can qualify as a favorable termination for a malicious-prosecution claim. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the dismissal could never satisfy that requirement.

The court allowed Grytsyk’s malicious-abuse-of-process claim to proceed against Sergeant Brendan McGurran, Officer David Lachmenar, Sergeant Jeffrey Murphy, Lieutenant Khan, Officer Ricardo DiCandia, Sergeant Douglas Schack, Officer Juan Desalto, Officer Mathimohman Mohandes, Officer Jose Espinal, Sergeant Vincent Forlenza, Officer Rahman, and Officer Gao. The claim concerned the twenty-one summonses issued between June and October 2018. The court concluded that the complaint alleged that the defendants used legal process not to enforce vending rules but to harm Grytsyk’s business. Claims of malicious abuse of process against other individual defendants were deemed withdrawn or abandoned because the complaint did not identify them as participants in that period’s summonses.

Claims Dismissed

The court dismissed Grytsyk’s excessive-force claim against Morales. Grytsyk alleged that the handcuffs aggravated his pre-existing hand condition and caused an extremely painful injury requiring medical attention. The court found that he did not allege that he told officers the handcuffs were too tight, that he remained handcuffed for an extended period, or specific facts describing the injury sufficiently to make the claim plausible.

The court dismissed Grytsyk’s due-process claim concerning the seizure of his artwork. It held that the complaint described the seizures as random and unauthorized acts rather than actions taken under an established municipal policy or by an official with final authority over the relevant matters. Because New York provides post-deprivation remedies such as negligence, replevin, or conversion claims for such losses, the alleged property deprivation did not state a federal due-process claim.

The court dismissed Grytsyk’s municipal-liability claim against the City. A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 only when an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. The court held that Grytsyk’s allegations that the police department sought to harass vendors and that superior officers instructed the individual defendants were conclusory. The court also noted that the dismissed excessive-force and property-deprivation claims could not support municipal liability because the court found no underlying constitutional violation for those claims.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The surviving claims were false arrest against Khan and Morales, malicious prosecution against Khan and Morales, and malicious abuse of process against the twelve officers identified above. The remaining claims were dismissed. The court declined to grant leave to amend the dismissed claims, explaining that Grytsyk had already amended his complaint and had not identified additional facts that could cure the defects. The remaining defendants were ordered to answer, and the court directed the clerk to terminate the dismissed defendants and the relevant motions.