Washington v. City of New York
- James Oetken
- 1:19-cv-00601
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Washington v. City of New York, Judge Oetken granted defendants’ dismissal motion, ruling parole officials immune from damages claims over a delayed revocation hearing.
Gregory A. Washington’s claims against Brigitte Fortune, Glenda Bubb, and Edward Delrio were dismissed or deemed subject to dismissal based on absolute immunity; his request for injunctive relief was also dismissed, and the case was closed.
What happened
In Washington v. City of New York, Gregory A. Washington, representing himself, claimed that delaying his final parole revocation hearing violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and caused him to remain in custody after his stated maximum expiration date. He sued, among others, administrative law judge Brigitte Fortune and parole officer Glenda Bubb.
Fortune and Bubb argued that they were immune from suit. The court ruled that Fortune’s decision to grant the adjournment and Bubb’s decision to request it were closely connected to the parole revocation proceeding. The court also concluded that injunctive relief could not remedy only past conduct and that Edward Delrio had the same immunity from personal liability as Bubb.
Judge J. Paul Oetken granted the motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the claims against Fortune and Bubb, dismissed the request for injunctive relief, and concluded that dismissal of the claims against Delrio was warranted; it directed the Clerk to close the case.
The detailed version
- Washington v. City of New York · No. 1:19-cv-00601
- James Oetken
- Mar. 24, 2021
Background
Gregory A. Washington, proceeding without a lawyer, claimed that his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when his final parole revocation hearing was adjourned from December 14, 2017, to December 29, 2017. He alleged that his maximum expiration date was December 21, 2017, and that the adjournment caused him to be held unjustly between that date and the rescheduled hearing.
Washington asserted claims against, among others, Brigitte Fortune, the administrative law judge who presided over the parole revocation proceedings, and Glenda Bubb, the parole officer who requested the adjournment. Fortune and Bubb moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Washington’s operative complaint also sought injunctive relief.
Absolute immunity
The court explained that judges and prosecutors generally receive absolute immunity from private damages actions for acts performed as part of their adjudicatory or prosecutorial functions. Administrative law judges receive the same protection when performing adjudicatory acts because their role and the safeguards in agency adjudication are functionally comparable to those of judges. Parole officers also receive absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts involved in presenting a parole-revocation case.
The court recognized that absolute immunity does not cover every administrative act by such officials. It nonetheless concluded that the decision to seek or grant an adjournment of a final parole revocation hearing was closely connected to a specific adjudicatory proceeding. The court compared that decision to a judge’s scheduling of a trial and held that Fortune and Bubb had absolute immunity for their decisions concerning the two-week adjournment.
Because Washington could not seek damages from Fortune and Bubb for those decisions, the court dismissed the claims against them.
Injunctive relief and Edward Delrio
The court noted that Washington’s earlier complaints sought damages for each day he was allegedly held beyond his maximum expiration date. His second amended complaint added a request for injunctive relief. The court concluded that injunctive relief could not redress an alleged injury based only on past conduct and dismissed that request.
The court also addressed claims against Chief of Parole Edward Delrio. It stated that the docket suggested Delrio had not been served, had not appeared, and had not moved to dismiss. Even so, the court concluded that dismissal of the claims against Delrio was warranted because he had the same absolute immunity from personal liability as Bubb.
Disposition
Judge J. Paul Oetken granted the motion to dismiss. The court directed the Clerk to close the motion, mail Washington a copy of the Opinion and Order, and close the case.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.