Vail v. The City of New York

Background

Andrew Vail, representing himself, alleged that he was incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island. He said he experienced anxiety, depression, and hopelessness and that his request for mental-health treatment was ignored. On May 17, 2018, he swallowed two AA batteries and components of a Sony radio to get the attention of mental-health services.

Vail alleged that social worker Lionel Brown saw him at the facility’s mental-health clinic, spoke with supervisor Beth LaGrange, and then sent Vail back to his cell. Vail alleged that Brown and LaGrange either ignored his report or that Brown failed to tell LaGrange that he had swallowed the objects. After returning to his cell, Vail began coughing blood and experiencing extreme pain. An X-ray on May 20 showed foreign objects in his stomach and esophagus, and he underwent two endoscopies to remove them.

Vail sued Brown, LaGrange, the City of New York, and New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law. He alleged that Brown and LaGrange were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also asserted state-law claims, including emotional-distress, malpractice, conspiracy, and negligence claims. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.

Federal civil-rights claims

The court dismissed the § 1983 claim against LaGrange because the complaint did not adequately allege her personal involvement in the decision to withhold medical treatment. The court said the allegations showed only that Brown briefly spoke with a supervisor who was identified, on information and belief, as LaGrange. The complaint also suggested that Brown may have withheld information from LaGrange. The court concluded that these allegations did not establish that LaGrange personally participated in the alleged denial of care.

The court also dismissed the § 1983 claims against the City of New York and New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation. Under the rule from Monell v. Department of Social Services, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional violation results from a municipal policy or custom. Vail alleged an unwritten policy of ignoring emergency-hotline calls from frequent users and a failure to train or supervise employees regarding medical and mental-health services. The court found that the complaint provided no supporting facts and therefore did not plausibly allege a municipal policy or custom.

The § 1983 claim against Brown was not challenged by the motion and remained intact.

State-law claims

The court declined to dismiss all state-law claims simply because some federal claims were dismissed. Because the § 1983 claim against Brown remained, the court continued to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims and considered the challenged claims individually.

The court dismissed Vail’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against Brown and LaGrange because the alleged conduct—ignoring Vail’s complaint that he needed medical treatment—did not meet New York’s demanding requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct. For the same reason, the court dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against Brown and LaGrange.

The court dismissed the medical-malpractice and social-work-malpractice claims against LaGrange because Vail did not adequately allege that she was involved in the treatment decision, departed from accepted professional practice, or caused his injury. The court dismissed the conspiracy claim because New York does not recognize conspiracy as an independent tort; it also noted that the allegations did not adequately distinguish a conspiracy from Brown acting alone.

The court dismissed the negligence claim against LaGrange because the complaint did not allege facts showing that she owed Vail a duty of care or caused his injuries. The remaining state-law claims identified by the court were the emotional-distress claims against the municipal defendants, the malpractice claims against New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, and the negligence claims against Brown and the municipal defendants.

Disposition

Judge J. Paul Oetken granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The § 1983 claims against LaGrange and the municipal defendants were dismissed, while the § 1983 claim against Brown remained. The state-law claims were dismissed in part, with the claims identified above remaining. The defendants were ordered to answer the remaining claims by January 30, 2020.