Dibble v. Schrodel

Background

The plaintiffs asserted seven causes of action. The first was a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against Defendants Schroedel, Hudson Valley Management Consulting, LLC (HVMC), Giaccio, Leavy, Cortese, and Cortese Construction, Inc. The second and third causes of action asserted federal antitrust claims under the Sherman Act and state antitrust claims under the Donnelly Act. The fourth cause of action alleged tortious interference with business relations. The fifth and sixth causes of action alleged tortious interference with contract. The seventh sought injunctive relief.

Defendants Schroedel, Giaccio, Sleepy Hollow Local Development Corp. (SHLDC), Wray, the Village of Sleepy Hollow, Leavy, Earth Improvements, Inc., and HVMC moved to dismiss. Defendant McGovern filed a separate motion.

Federal Claims

The court granted in part the dismissal motions of Schroedel, Giaccio, SHLDC, Wray, the Village of Sleepy Hollow, Leavy, Earth Improvements, Inc., and HVMC. The court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a RICO claim against Schroedel, HVMC, Giaccio, and Leavy. The plaintiffs had previously chosen to voluntarily dismiss their RICO claims against Cortese and Cortese Construction, Inc. with prejudice. The court therefore dismissed the first cause of action with prejudice.

The court also ruled that the plaintiffs failed to allege a sufficient connection to interstate commerce for their Sherman Act claims. The plaintiffs had previously chosen to voluntarily dismiss their Sherman Act claims against Cortese and Cortese Construction, Inc. with prejudice. The court dismissed the federal antitrust claims in the second and third causes of action with prejudice.

State Claims and Disposition

The remaining claims arose under state law: the Donnelly Act claims in the second and third causes of action, the business-relations interference claim in the fourth cause of action, the contract-interference claims in the fifth and sixth causes of action, and the request for injunctive relief in the seventh cause of action.

Because all federal claims had been dismissed before trial, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning its authority to hear the related state-law claims. The court dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice. It denied McGovern’s motion to dismiss as moot. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motions and close the case. Judge Cathy Seibel’s order states that the reasons for the rulings were given on the record, but that oral explanation is not included in the provided text.