Larach-Cohen v. David C. Banks
- Laura Swain
- 1:19-cv-07623-LTS-SDA
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 7
In Larach-Cohen v. Porter, Judge Swain granted SED’s motion to dismiss claims against it because the complaint stated no available legal claim.
The ruling ended the New York State Education Department’s involvement as a defendant. It did not itself resolve the claims against the New York City Department of Education or Meisha Porter, and it concerned the parents’ claims relating to M.C.’s special-education proceedings.
What happened
In Larach-Cohen v. Meisha Porter, Linda Larach-Cohen and Rolando Cohen sued on behalf of M.C., a student with a disability, over the handling of M.C.’s special-education proceedings and placement at iBRAIN. They sued the New York State Education Department, the New York City Department of Education, and Meisha Porter in her official capacity.
The parents claimed that the New York State Education Department was responsible for supervising the appointment of hearing officers and had failed to ensure that a hearing officer was appointed for their 2019–2020 proceeding. The state agency asked the court to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that the complaint did not state a legally valid claim.
Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted the state agency’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint as against it and directed the Clerk to terminate the agency’s involvement in the case. The court held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act did not authorize these claims against the state agency and that the court could not grant the requested state-law relief against that agency.
The detailed version
- Larach-Cohen v. David C. Banks · No. 1:19-cv-07623-LTS-SDA
- Laura Swain
- Mar. 30, 2021
Background
Linda Larach-Cohen and Rolando Cohen sued as parents of M.C., a teenager with a brain injury who was classified as a student with a disability. M.C. attended the International Academy of Hope during the 2017–2018 school year and later enrolled at iBRAIN. For the 2018–2019 school year, the school district developed an individualized education program providing for placement in a public school.
The parents began a special-education due-process proceeding in July 2018, alleging that the New York City Department of Education did not provide M.C. with a free appropriate public education and seeking funding for M.C.’s placement at iBRAIN while the proceeding was pending. An initial hearing officer ordered the Department of Education to fund the placement, but a state review officer later reversed that determination. In a prior related proceeding, the court granted the Department of Education’s motion for summary judgment and held that the parents were not entitled to pendency payments for the 2018–2019 school year.
For the 2019–2020 school year, M.C. remained at iBRAIN. The parents began another due-process proceeding and sought funding during its pendency. Their request to consolidate the two proceedings was denied, six hearing officers recused themselves, and the Department of Education had not secured a hearing officer as of the last submission on the motion.
The parents’ Second Amended Complaint asserted claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New York Education Law. They alleged that the New York State Education Department was responsible for appointing and supervising hearing officers and had failed to appoint or direct the Department of Education to appoint one for the 2019–2020 proceeding. The state agency moved to dismiss the claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Court’s Analysis
On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. The court held that, to the extent the parents relied on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s provision for court review of a denial of a free appropriate public education, the state agency was not a proper defendant. The court explained that local educational agencies, rather than state agencies, participate in the individualized education program process and are the proper parties for disputes about whether a student received a free appropriate public education.
The court also rejected the parents’ argument that they could sue the state agency for failing to perform its general supervisory duties under another provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The court held that the Act does not create a private right of action—a legal authorization for a private person to sue—for alleged violations of those supervisory duties. New York regulations implementing the Act did not change that conclusion.
To the extent the parents sought relief under state law, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory or injunctive relief against the state agency because such claims were protected by the state’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Disposition
The court granted the New York State Education Department’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint as against it. The Clerk was directed to terminate the state agency’s involvement in the case. The court separately directed the parents and the remaining defendants to file a status report addressing whether a hearing officer had been appointed, whether the underlying proceeding had ended, and whether the claims against the remaining defendants should also be dismissed.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.