Knopf v. Esposito

Background

Norma Knopf, individually and as a distributee and the executor named in Michael Knopf’s last will, brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that Frank M. Esposito, Edward Feldman, and others conspired with Melissa Ringel, an employee of the New York Appellate Division, to violate her Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. She claimed that the alleged conduct deprived her of property interests in a condominium unit known as Penthouse C and in the proceeds from its sale without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

The dispute arose from a 2006 loan by Michael and Norma Knopf to Michael Sanford and Sanford’s company, Pursuit Holdings, LLC. The Knopfs later obtained summary judgment on the loan agreements in state court, while their constructive-trust claim remained unresolved. In 2015, the Appellate Division issued orders concerning whether Penthouse C could be sold and whether sale proceeds had to be held in escrow. In January 2016, Feldman, a real-estate attorney involved in the sale, participated in a telephone call with Ringel about whether restrictions remained on the sale. Ringel said that no restriction remained. The condominium was sold on February 1, 2016, and the closing included a $50,000 payment to Esposito Partners PLLC.

The Knopfs later filed this federal action. The Court of Appeals vacated an earlier dismissal and remanded the case after concluding that the allegations plausibly showed that Ringel was a state actor, that her statements could constitute improper communications outside the Knopfs’ participation, and that the Knopfs had an equitable interest in the condominium. Sanford was later dismissed from the case by stipulation, and the Knopfs settled with Nathaniel Akerman and Dorsey & Whitney, LLP. Esposito and Feldman remained as defendants.

Legal standard

Summary judgment must be granted when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. A genuine dispute exists when a reasonable jury could decide for the opposing party. The court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences favorably to the party opposing the motion.

To prove a § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show an agreement involving a state actor and a private entity or multiple state actors, coordinated action intended to cause an unconstitutional injury, and an act carried out to advance that goal that caused harm. Because the alleged conspiracy concerned procedural due process, Knopf also had to show a protected property interest and deprivation of that interest without constitutionally adequate procedures.

Court’s analysis

Knopf argued that Feldman conspired with Ringel and others. Feldman moved for summary judgment, arguing that no admissible evidence showed that he conspired with a state actor to violate Knopf’s due-process rights.

The court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that Knopf might prove at trial that Sanford, Ringel, and others agreed to deprive her of due-process rights. But the court held that Knopf had not identified enough evidence to create a factual dispute about whether Feldman knew about that agreement. Feldman had been retained as a real-estate attorney for the sale, and the court found no evidence of a personal relationship or other connection between Feldman and Sanford beyond that professional work.

The court also found that Feldman’s participation in the telephone call did not establish knowing involvement in a conspiracy. Sanford obtained the telephone number and gave it to Akerman, who called Feldman and then dialed the number. Feldman testified that he did not know whose number Akerman called, did not know that the person was a state court employee married to Esposito, and did not know of any agreement involving Ringel. The court noted that this testimony was not contradicted by evidence sufficient to create a jury question.

The court rejected Knopf’s arguments based on several additional facts. Feldman’s reference to calling “the clerk” did not show that he knew the call would reach Ringel or that she was allegedly acting improperly. His use of Ringel’s first name after the call did not show prior knowledge of her identity or relationship with Esposito. His role in directing the $50,000 payment to Esposito Partners PLLC at Sanford’s direction did not show that he knew about Esposito’s connection to Ringel. The court also found that Feldman’s later production of a non-final closing-disbursement document and his inaccurate 2017 deposition recollection about how the call began did not provide sufficient evidence that he had joined the alleged conspiracy.

Disposition

The court granted Feldman’s April 2, 2021 motion for summary judgment. This opinion did not decide Knopf’s motion for summary judgment against Esposito or Esposito’s cross-motion; the court stated that those motions were addressed in a separate opinion.