Steffen v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Andrea Steffen, proceeding without a lawyer when she filed the case, alleged constitutional violations against the City and County of San Francisco, Sergeant Leonard Caldera, and Sergeant Susan Nangle arising from the February 2017 seizure of her truck. The court later appointed counsel for settlement purposes and then for all purposes. The parties’ settlement conference did not resolve the case.

Defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute about a fact important to the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steffen also asked to reopen discovery. The court denied that request because it was made after the summary-judgment hearing and because self-represented litigants must still comply with the summary-judgment rules.

Rulings

Claim one: seizure of the truck and its contents

The court denied summary judgment on Steffen’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Caldera for allegedly violating the Fourth Amendment by seizing her truck without probable cause. The court found that the undisputed facts established probable cause to seize the truck itself: a suspect in an aggravated assault, Anthony Ocampo, had been seen entering the truck immediately after the assault, and blood evidence was present on it.

The court found material factual disputes, however, about whether probable cause supported seizing Steffen’s personal possessions inside the truck. Before the truck and belongings were seized, officers allowed Steffen and Ocampo to leave the truck, questioned Steffen, and then allowed her back inside for approximately 45 minutes with unlimited access to her possessions. Because of those disputes, the court also denied summary judgment on Steffen’s claim under California Vehicle Code section 22655.5, which permits removal of a vehicle and its contents when an officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence that cannot readily be removed and tends to show that a crime occurred.

The court further held that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was not appropriate at that time. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages liability in some circumstances, but the court concluded that the factual disputes about the seizure of Steffen’s possessions prevented resolving that defense on summary judgment.

Claim two: alleged state-created danger by Caldera

The court granted summary judgment on Steffen’s § 1983 claim that Caldera violated her Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights by placing her in danger. The court explained that the state-created-danger exception requires evidence that state action affirmatively placed a person in a particular danger that would not otherwise have existed, that the resulting harm was foreseeable, and that the state actor acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger.

The court found it undisputed that Officer Kelly Kensic offered to contact the Homeless Outreach Team to help Steffen find shelter on the night her truck was seized and that Steffen refused the offer. The court therefore distinguished the cases Steffen cited and granted summary judgment on this claim.

Claim three and related state-law claims against Nangle

The court granted summary judgment on Steffen’s § 1983 claim that Nangle violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights by failing to provide a tow and fee-waiver hearing. Steffen did not present evidence showing that Nangle, rather than another San Francisco official, was responsible for providing that hearing.

For the same reason, the court granted summary judgment on Steffen’s claims that Nangle’s failure to provide a tow and fee-waiver hearing violated California Vehicle Code section 22852 and section 10C.8 of the San Francisco Administrative Code. The court granted summary judgment on these three claims without prejudice to Steffen amending the second amended complaint to assert them against a different defendant.

Claim four: alleged state-created danger by Nangle

The court granted summary judgment on Steffen’s § 1983 claim that Nangle violated her Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights by allowing a danger to continue for six days. The court found that Steffen did not present evidence that Nangle, or anyone else, took affirmative action toward her or knew enough about her circumstances for Nangle’s conduct to amount to deliberate indifference.

Claim five: San Francisco’s General Order 9.06

The court granted summary judgment on Steffen’s § 1983 claim against San Francisco alleging that the San Francisco Police Department’s General Order 9.06 violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights. The order addresses vehicle holds, which prevent release of a towed vehicle until the appropriate investigative section removes the hold.

Steffen argued that she was repeatedly told only Nangle could arrange the return of her property and removal of the hold, and that delays could result because an investigator might not be available around the clock. The court held that an individual officer’s inaccurate information about how the order operated did not by itself establish municipal liability. Under § 1983, a municipality cannot be held responsible merely because it employs an officer who allegedly caused harm; the plaintiff must show that an official municipal policy caused the constitutional injury.

Disposition

The court denied summary judgment on the truck-and-contents seizure claims against Caldera, including the related California Vehicle Code section 22655.5 claim, and denied qualified immunity at that stage. It granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, including the claims against Caldera, Nangle, and San Francisco described above. The three claims concerning the tow and fee-waiver hearing against Nangle were granted without prejudice to amendment against a different defendant.