Kayo v. Mertz

Background

Hugo Kayo brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing damages claims for violations of federal rights by people acting under state law. He sued Bridge and Tunnel Officers Peter Mertz, Kendra Corbin, Charles Luce, and Thomas Zapata, and Sergeant Dennis Palazzola. Kayo alleged that the defendants falsely arrested him, used excessive force, failed to intervene to stop constitutional violations, and denied him a fair trial by submitting false information to prosecutors.

The incident occurred at the Robert F. Kennedy Bridge toll plaza on January 17, 2016. Kayo had left a vehicle in a toll lane while carrying an electronic toll pass toward another car. The parties disputed what orders the officers gave him, whether he was trying to comply, whether Mertz touched him before giving an order, whether Kayo resisted arrest, and whether his actions obstructed traffic. Surveillance video captured parts of the incident but had no audio and did not resolve the disputes.

Mertz later stated in a criminal complaint that he had seen Kayo leave his vehicle and run toward the toll gate. The opinion states that Mertz had not seen Kayo leave the vehicle and that Kayo did not run toward the toll gate. Kayo was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, was released on his own recognizance, and later accepted an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. The charges were dismissed, and the dismissal was sealed.

Motions and legal standards

After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result. Kayo moved for summary judgment on his fair-trial claim. The court also denied the defendants’ motion to strike Kayo’s late-filed reply because the defendants had not identified prejudice from the delay.

False arrest

The court denied summary judgment for the defendants on Kayo’s false-arrest claims against Corbin, Mertz, Luce, and Zapata. A warrantless arrest generally requires probable cause, meaning facts known to the officer that would lead a reasonable person to believe an offense was committed. The court found material disputes about whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Kayo for disorderly conduct, harassment, traffic-law violations, violating Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority rules, or resisting arrest.

The court also denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity for those officers. Qualified immunity can protect an officer when a reasonably competent officer could have believed the arrest was lawful. The court held that the disputed facts— including which officers gave orders, how many orders were given, whether Kayo tried to comply, and whether the officers interfered with his attempts to comply—made it premature to decide that defense.

The court granted summary judgment to Sergeant Palazzola on the false-arrest claim. Palazzola arrived after Kayo had been handcuffed and relied on the accounts of the officers who had been present. The court held that it was objectively reasonable for him to rely on those accounts, so qualified immunity applied.

Excessive force

The court granted summary judgment to Corbin, Mertz, Luce, and Zapata on Kayo’s federal excessive-force claims. Under the Fourth Amendment, force used during an arrest must be objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances. The court stated that officers may use some physical force to make an arrest and that the legality of the arrest is analyzed separately from the amount of force used.

Kayo testified that he suffered scrapes on his knees and elbows and pain in his ribs and neck, but he did not seek medical treatment or treat the injuries himself and did not testify that the pain or scrapes lasted after the arrest. The court held that, even viewing the facts in Kayo’s favor, these injuries and the undisputed description of the force were too minor to allow a reasonable jury to find a federal excessive-force violation. The court therefore did not decide whether qualified immunity also applied.

Failure to intervene

The court denied summary judgment on the claims that Corbin, Mertz, Luce, and Zapata failed to intervene to prevent a false arrest. Because the court allowed the underlying false-arrest claims to continue, it did not dismiss those intervention claims on the ground that no constitutional violation could have occurred. The court said it would assess at trial, for each officer, whether the evidence showed a realistic opportunity to intervene.

The court granted summary judgment on the claims that those four officers failed to intervene to prevent excessive force because it had granted summary judgment on the underlying excessive-force claims. It also granted Sergeant Palazzola qualified immunity on the failure-to-intervene claim concerning the arrest because he arrived after the arrest and reasonably relied on the other officers’ accounts.

Fair-trial claim

The parties’ fair-trial motions concerned Mertz’s two false statements in the criminal complaint. The court held that Kayo’s acceptance of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal did not qualify as a favorable termination of the criminal case for purposes of a § 1983 fair-trial claim based on fabricated evidence. The court adopted the approach taken by most district courts in the circuit after the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonough v. Smith, while noting that the Second Circuit had not yet resolved the issue and that the law had been unsettled.

Because Kayo accepted the adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, the court held that he could not satisfy the favorable-termination requirement. It granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the fair-trial claim and denied Kayo’s motion. The court also dismissed the claim against Corbin because Kayo had not addressed it or presented evidence concerning her, and the opinion states that Kayo agreed to withdraw the claim against Luce, Zapata, and Palazzola.

Disposition

Judge Paul A. Engelmayer granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Kayo’s partial motion. Specifically, the court granted defendants’ motion on the fair-trial claim, the excessive-force claims, and failure-to-intervene claims relating to excessive force; granted summary judgment on all remaining claims against Sergeant Palazzola; and denied defendants’ motion on all other claims. The court directed the parties to submit letters addressing whether Kayo had brought and preserved any parallel state-law claims and, if so, which survived the decision.