Wheeler v. DeYoung

Background

Damon Wheeler sued the City of Middletown, Police Officer Nathaniel DeYoung, Police Officer George Neilson, and Sergeant Ronald Magsamen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law. He alleged false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, denial of due process and a fair trial, and abuse of process. He also asserted New York state-law claims for false arrest and abuse of process.

Wheeler alleged that on April 26, 2014, DeYoung and Neilson stopped him at gunpoint, arrested him before searching his person and vehicle, and seized his cellphone. He alleged that the phone contained a video of police misconduct and that its contents were later erased or edited. He also alleged that officers searched his residence and that the searches permanently destroyed his vehicle and residence. Wheeler was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance and obstruction of governmental administration. The controlled-substance charge was dismissed, and the New York Court of Appeals later reversed his obstruction conviction because the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly states a legal claim. Wheeler did not oppose dismissal of several claims, including municipal liability, excessive force, malicious prosecution, assault, battery, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent infliction of emotional harm, and intentional infliction of emotional harm.

Rulings on the Federal Claims

The court dismissed Wheeler’s Section 1983 claims against Sergeant Magsamen because the amended complaint did not allege that he personally participated in the conduct underlying those claims. The allegation that Magsamen followed Wheeler in an unmarked vehicle was not enough to show personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations.

The court allowed Wheeler’s Section 1983 false-arrest claim against DeYoung and Neilson to proceed. Accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, the court found that Wheeler plausibly alleged that he was arrested before the officers searched his vehicle and before they could have probable cause based on the search. The court also declined to grant the officers qualified immunity at this stage because their argument relied on their own version of events rather than facts established by the complaint.

The court also allowed Wheeler’s Section 1983 unlawful-search-and-seizure claim against DeYoung and Neilson to proceed. Wheeler plausibly alleged that the searches of his person, vehicle, and residence were unreasonable and that the searches caused extensive property destruction, including damage to his vehicle and residence and the destruction of his cellphone’s contents.

The court allowed Wheeler’s due-process claim against DeYoung and Neilson to proceed. It held that the claim was not duplicative of the false-arrest claim because it concerned later alleged conduct, including preparing and swearing to a false criminal complaint, withholding evidence and information about the warrants, and mishandling Wheeler’s property while he was in custody.

The court also allowed Wheeler’s Section 1983 abuse-of-process claim against DeYoung and Neilson to proceed. Wheeler alleged that the officers obtained and used search warrants with the improper objective of taking his cellphone and concealing video evidence of alleged police misconduct. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient at the dismissal stage.

State-Law Claims

The court dismissed Wheeler’s New York state-law false-arrest and abuse-of-process claims because he did not timely serve a notice of claim under New York General Municipal Law § 50-e. The false-arrest claim accrued when Wheeler was released from custody, and the court inferred from the allegations that the notice served in July 2020 was too late. The abuse-of-process claim was based on the alleged misuse of the search-warrant process on April 26, 2014, so the notice served in 2020 was also untimely.

Disposition

The court’s motion-to-dismiss ruling was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Section 1983 claims for false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, deprivation of due process or a fair trial, and abuse of process against DeYoung and Neilson may proceed. All other claims were dismissed. The City of Middletown and Sergeant Magsamen were terminated as defendants, and DeYoung and Neilson were ordered to answer the remaining claims.