Brandenburg v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America

Background

Elizabeth Brandenburg and Maria Kallis alleged that they worked as “sanctified nuns” at the All Saints Monastery from 2010 to 2018. They alleged that Father Gerasimos Makris sexually harassed them, that they complained to Archdiocese clergy, and that the Archdiocese retaliated against them. They also alleged that they were not paid for their work and that Mother Eisodia falsely told parishioners, potential parishioners, and police that they had stolen a monastery car.

The plaintiffs asserted discrimination, retaliation, hostile-work-environment, constructive-discharge, gender-discrimination, unpaid-wage, and defamation claims under New York law. The defendants moved under Rule 12(b) to dismiss all claims. On such a motion, the court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly state a claim.

Ministerial exception

The court held that Brandenburg and Kallis were ministers for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. Although the Archdiocese allegedly referred to them as laypeople, they were formally called nuns, were sanctified, and performed important religious duties, including running and singing in Mass services and meeting with students at a parochial school.

The court concluded that the ministerial exception barred the gender-discrimination claim because it challenged tangible employment actions, including the plaintiffs’ alleged constructive discharge and lack of salaries. It also dismissed the retaliation claim to the extent it was based on tangible employment actions and dismissed the Civil Rights Law claim to the extent the corresponding New York State Human Rights Law claims were dismissed.

The court did not dismiss the hostile-work-environment claim under the ministerial exception because the defendants had not moved on that basis. It also held that the constructive-discharge claim could proceed because the complaint characterized it as an aggravated form of sexual harassment or hostile work environment rather than as a challenge to a tangible employment action. The retaliation claim could proceed to the extent it was based solely on alleged harassment and not on a tangible employment action.

New York City Human Rights Law claims

The court dismissed the New York City Human Rights Law claims because the complaint did not plausibly allege that the alleged discrimination or retaliation had an impact within New York City. The plaintiffs lived and primarily worked in Calverton, New York, and the complaint’s allegations about trips to New York City and conduct at the Archdiocese’s New York City headquarters showed only a tangential connection to the city.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend these claims because their opposition papers suggested they might possess facts that could cure the pleading deficiency. The plaintiffs were directed to file an amended complaint within three weeks of the opinion and order.

Hostile-work-environment claims

The court denied the motion to dismiss the New York State Human Rights Law hostile-work-environment claims as time-barred. It held that the alleged harassment constituted a continuing violation and that at least one alleged act—Father Makris’s conduct continuing through April 2017—fell within the three-year limitations period.

Unpaid-wage claims

The court dismissed the New York Labor Law claims for unpaid minimum and overtime wages. The statute excludes people permitted to work as members of a religious order or as ordained or licensed religious ministers. The court held that the plaintiffs worked as members of a religious order because they were joined under religious authority and performed religious work. Their lack of pay, including the alleged difference between their treatment and that of male clergy, did not change their exclusion from New York Labor Law coverage.

Defamation claims

The court held that statements accusing the plaintiffs of stealing a car were defamatory on their face because stealing property is punishable by imprisonment. But statements to police were conditionally privileged, and the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Mother Eisodia made the initial police report with spite, ill will, or a high awareness that the statements were probably false. The court therefore dismissed the defamation claims to the extent they were based on communications with police.

The claims based on statements to parishioners and potential parishioners survived. The court did not decide whether a religious organization’s common-interest privilege applied to those communications, because the privilege would be conditional in any event and the plaintiffs plausibly alleged malice: Mother Eisodia allegedly continued making the accusations after learning that the car was not stolen and belonged to the plaintiffs. Defamation claims based on statements that Kallis had done “bad things” were also subject to dismissal because the complaint did not allege that those statements were false and did not allege special damages or defamation on its face.

Disposition

Judge Jesse M. Furman granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the gender-discrimination claims; retaliation claims based on tangible employment actions; New York City Human Rights Law claims; New York Labor Law claims; defamation claims based on statements to police; and Civil Rights Law claims to the extent the corresponding state-law claims were dismissed. The court stated that the other claims were dismissed with prejudice, while the plaintiffs’ New York City Human Rights Law claims were dismissed with leave to amend. The remaining claims otherwise survived.