Brock v. Zuckerberg
- Lewis Liman
- 1:20-cv-07513
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 13
In Brock v. Zuckerberg, Judge Liman dismissed Brock’s claims with prejudice and denied defendants’ request to transfer the case.
Mandela Brock’s claims against Facebook and the individual defendants were dismissed with prejudice; the defendants’ request to transfer the case was denied.
What happened
In Brock v. Zuckerberg, Mandela Brock, representing himself, claimed that Facebook and several individuals violated his constitutional rights by removing or blocking his Facebook posts. He also brought claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law.
The defendants argued that Brock’s complaint did not state a valid claim and alternatively asked the court to transfer the case to California. The court concluded that Facebook was a private company rather than a government actor, that Brock had not adequately connected the individual defendants to the post removals, and that Facebook was protected by a federal law governing online content providers. The court also rejected Brock’s racketeering theories.
Judge Liman granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice and denied the motion to transfer. The court directed the clerk to close the case.
The detailed version
- Brock v. Zuckerberg · No. 1:20-cv-07513
- Lewis Liman
- June 25, 2021
Background
Mandela Brock, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Facebook, Inc., Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl Sandberg, Sean Parker, and unidentified defendants. Brock alleged that Facebook removed or blocked his posts at least 30 times between March and September 2020. The posts were flagged under Facebook’s policies concerning spam, hate speech, abusive content, and partly false content.
Brock claimed that the removals violated his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court understood the principal constitutional claim to arise under the First Amendment’s protection of speech. Brock also asserted claims that the court primarily construed under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a federal law addressing liability for online content providers. In addition, Brock alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO, based largely on the defendants’ effort to enforce a forum-selection clause and transfer the case.
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), arguing that Brock had not stated a claim for relief. They alternatively moved to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The court had previously dismissed claims against Mark Pincus as frivolous; the ruling summarized here addressed the defendants’ later motion concerning the amended complaint.
Reasons for the Decision
Constitutional claims against Facebook. The court held that Facebook was not a state actor. The Constitution restricts government conduct, not the conduct of private companies, unless the private company performs an exclusively governmental function, is compelled by the government, or acts jointly with the government. Operating an online speech platform was not a function traditionally and exclusively performed by the government. Facebook’s status as a publicly held company and its alleged role as a “new town square” did not change that conclusion. The court therefore held that Brock’s First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Facebook failed at the threshold.
Claims against Zuckerberg and Sandberg. The court held that Brock had not pleaded enough facts connecting Zuckerberg or Sandberg personally to Facebook’s removal of his posts. General allegations that they permitted or tolerated suppression of speech did not provide a sufficient factual connection to the challenged conduct. The court also concluded that Brock had not pleaded a plausible connection between either individual and the content-removal claims under Section 230.
Section 230 claims. The court concluded that Facebook qualified as an interactive computer service under Section 230(c)(1). Brock’s claims concerned Facebook’s removal of content that Brock created or shared, rather than content supplied by Facebook or the individual defendants. Section 230(c)(1) protects a service provider from lawsuits treating it as the publisher or speaker when it exercises traditional editorial functions, including deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content. The court therefore held that Facebook was immune from claims based on removing objectionable content.
RICO claims. The court held that the RICO theories based on the defendants’ motion to transfer failed because litigation activity alone cannot serve as a viable RICO predicate act. The court identified the claims it construed as based primarily on the transfer motion, including theories involving mail fraud, obstruction of state or local law enforcement, interference with commerce, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). The court separately held that Brock’s claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1029 failed because he alleged no facts suggesting that Facebook used access devices in an unauthorized manner.
Disposition
Judge Liman granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice. The court denied the defendants’ alternative motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, stating in the conclusion that transfer was unnecessary and would not be a beneficial use of judicial resources. The clerk was directed to close the case.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.