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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled July 1, 2021

Zappin v. Supple

Judge
Lorna Schofield
Docket
1:20-cv-05602
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
10
Motion to DismissContractTortPro Se
In one sentence

Zappin v. Supple: Judge Schofield granted defendants’ motion to dismiss malpractice, fraud, and contract claims for failure to state a claim.

Who this affects

Anthony Zappin’s fraud, breach-of-contract, and legal-malpractice claims against J. Richard Supple, Jr., and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP were dismissed; defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted.

What happened

In Zappin v. Supple, Anthony Zappin, representing himself, sued J. Richard Supple, Jr., and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and fraud. Zappin alleged that Supple’s work during attorney-discipline proceedings contributed to his disbarment.

The court reviewed a magistrate judge’s recommendations. It agreed that the fraud and contract claims should be dismissed, and it rejected the recommendation to allow the malpractice claim to continue. The court also ruled that the malpractice claim was not barred by the rule limiting federal review of state-court judgments, but found that Zappin had not plausibly alleged that the alleged negligence caused him to avoid disbarment.

Judge Lorna G. Schofield adopted the recommendations in part and rejected them in part, and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss under the rule for failure to state a claim. The order dismissed all three claims; it said Zappin could request permission to file another amended complaint if he believed he could correct the deficiencies.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Zappin v. Supple · No. 1:20-cv-05602
Judge
Lorna Schofield
Date
July 1, 2021

Background

Anthony Zappin, an attorney proceeding without a lawyer, sued J. Richard Supple, Jr., and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP. Zappin alleged legal malpractice, breach of contract, and fraud arising from Supple’s representation of him during attorney-discipline proceedings.

The New York Attorney Grievance Committee sought a finding that Zappin committed attorney misconduct based on his conduct while representing himself in a family-law proceeding. The First Department granted that request and found Zappin guilty of multiple professional-conduct violations. Supple later represented Zappin during the proceeding concerning the appropriate sanction. A referee recommended disbarment, and the First Department disbarred Zappin on March 8, 2018.

Zappin alleged that Supple said he would pursue several actions, including motions concerning the misconduct finding, a stay, and settlement discussions, but did not do so. Zappin also alleged that Supple failed to take various actions during the sanctions hearing.

Report and Recommendations

A magistrate judge recommended dismissing the fraud and contract claims but allowing the legal-malpractice claim to proceed. Defendants objected to the recommendation concerning malpractice. No party objected to the recommendations concerning fraud and breach of contract.

The court adopted and rejected portions of the report. It adopted the recommendations concerning service and the timeliness of the fraud and malpractice claims. It also adopted the recommendations to dismiss the fraud claim for failing to meet the heightened pleading requirements for fraud and to dismiss the contract claim as duplicative. It rejected the recommendation that the malpractice claim was adequately pleaded.

Malpractice Claim

The court held that the rule barring federal district-court review of certain state-court judgments did not apply. Zappin’s malpractice claim sought to consider whether he would have been in a better position if the alleged malpractice had not occurred; it did not ask the federal court to review and reject the state court’s disbarment judgment.

The court nevertheless dismissed the malpractice claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Under the legal standard applied by the court, a malpractice claim required allegations that the attorney failed to use the ordinary skill and knowledge of the legal profession, that the failure caused the plaintiff’s injury, and that the plaintiff suffered actual, measurable damages. The required causation showing was that, without the attorney’s negligence, the plaintiff would have prevailed.

The court found that Zappin had not alleged facts plausibly showing that he would not have been disbarred without Supple’s alleged negligence. The misconduct finding occurred before Zappin retained Supple, and the amended complaint did not allege facts suggesting that a motion to reconsider, clarify, stay, or otherwise challenge that finding would have changed the First Department’s determination that Zappin committed misconduct. Regarding the sanctions hearing, the court stated that the referee’s role was to consider aggravating or mitigating evidence and recommend a sanction, not to alter or disregard the earlier misconduct findings. The amended complaint did not allege that omitted mitigating evidence or other conduct by defendants would have changed the outcome.

Disposition

The court adopted the report in part and rejected it in part. Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted under Rule 12(b)(6), and Zappin’s fraud, breach-of-contract, and legal-malpractice claims were dismissed. The court stated that another amendment was unlikely to cure the deficiencies but allowed Zappin to request permission to file a second amended complaint by submitting a letter and proposed pleading by July 15, 2021. The Clerk was directed to close the motion.

The authoritative version

Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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