Savarese v. City of New York

Background

James Savarese sued the City of New York and individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against persons who violate constitutional rights while acting under state authority. The case arose from a July 1, 2015 confrontation involving Savarese, acquaintance Shaun Reen, and New York City traffic agent Mohammad Islam. Islam was issuing traffic summonses while on duty. Reen confronted him about parking in front of a fire hydrant, and Savarese arrived, discussed the situation, and took photographs of Islam’s vehicle.

Islam told police that Reen and Savarese had blocked his vehicle and prevented him from leaving. Savarese denied blocking the vehicle, although he acknowledged standing behind it briefly to take photographs. Police officers and supervisors spoke with the participants and then arrested Savarese and Reen for obstructing governmental administration. Savarese was taken to a precinct and then to Queens Central Booking. He was arraigned the following day, accepted an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, and the criminal matter was later dismissed.

Savarese’s complaint asserted claims involving false arrest, unreasonable seizure, First Amendment retaliation, fabrication of evidence, excessive detention, failure to intervene, conspiracy, supervisory liability, and municipal liability against the City. In opposing summary judgment, he abandoned his conditions-of-confinement claim and claims based only on supervisory status, while arguing that certain defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations.

Summary-judgment standard

The court explained that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, but a party cannot defeat summary judgment with speculation, conclusory statements, or evidence that no reasonable jury could credit.

False arrest

The court granted summary judgment on Savarese’s false-arrest claim against Officers William Grieshaber and Michael Fransson and Sergeant Keith Burkitt. A false-arrest claim under § 1983 generally requires an arrest without probable cause. Probable cause exists when the facts known to the officers would lead a reasonable officer to believe that the person committed an offense.

The relevant offense, second-degree obstructing governmental administration under New York Penal Law § 195.05, covers intentionally obstructing or preventing a public servant from performing an official function through intimidation, physical force, interference, or an independently unlawful act. The court held that the officers had probable cause based on Islam’s statements that Savarese and Reen blocked the front and rear of his vehicle, refused requests to move, and prevented him from leaving and continuing his duties. Savarese’s admission that he had stood behind the vehicle to take photographs, along with the officers’ observations at the scene, supported that determination.

The court acknowledged disputes about where Savarese was standing and whether he actually obstructed Islam. It held, however, that those disputes were not material to whether the officers had probable cause at the time of arrest. The officers were entitled to rely on information from the alleged victim and were not required to resolve every possible claim of innocence before making the arrest. Evidence from bystanders and Savarese’s nephew did not defeat probable cause because the officers did not possess that information when they arrested him.

The court also granted summary judgment for Captain Daniel Mahoney. Regardless of whether Mahoney participated in the arrest decision at the scene or became involved at the precinct, the court held that he could rely on the information available to the other officers and had the same probable cause. The arrest occurred when Savarese was told he was not free to leave and was taken to the precinct; the later booking and processing were not separate arrests requiring a new probable-cause determination.

The court granted summary judgment for Islam and Debra Youmans on different grounds. It held that Islam did not order or carry out Savarese’s arrest, did not ask police to arrest him, and left the arrest decision to the officers’ independent judgment. Although Islam was a government employee, the court concluded that his reports about an incident in which he claimed to be the victim were not actions taken under state authority for purposes of § 1983. Youmans may have asked officers to make an arrest, but the officers did not act on that request and instead made their own decision. The evidence therefore did not show that either person caused the arrest.

Conspiracy

The court granted summary judgment on the § 1983 conspiracy theory. Savarese argued that Islam and the officers agreed to arrest him because he criticized Islam’s parking and photographed the vehicle. The court found no evidence of a meeting of the minds, shared plan, or agreement to fabricate a charge or cause an unconstitutional arrest. The alleged statement by Mahoney that Savarese should show more respect and not take pictures did not establish a conspiracy.

First Amendment retaliation

The court rejected Savarese’s First Amendment retaliation theories. Under the governing rule, a retaliatory-arrest plaintiff generally must show that the arrest lacked probable cause, unless objective evidence shows that similarly situated people who did not engage in protected activity were not arrested. Because the court found probable cause and Savarese offered no such objective evidence, his claim that he was arrested for criticizing Islam or photographing the vehicle failed.

The court also found no evidence that Mahoney caused an intentionally prolonged detention in retaliation for Savarese’s comments or photographs. Nor did Islam’s brief act of backing his vehicle a few inches toward Savarese establish retaliation: the evidence did not show that Islam intended to chill Savarese’s speech or actually prevented him from taking photographs.

Fabrication of evidence

The court granted summary judgment on the fabrication-of-evidence claim. Savarese alleged that Islam and Grieshaber falsely reported that he had blocked Islam’s vehicle and refused to move. The court held that Islam was acting as a complaining witness, not as an investigating officer, and had immunity for testimony and discussions with the prosecutor in judicial proceedings.

As to Grieshaber, the court found no genuine dispute that Islam had provided the information reflected in the criminal complaint. Grieshaber’s later inability to recall some information did not by itself show that the information had been fabricated. The court also held that Savarese’s acceptance of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal did not qualify as the favorable termination required for this type of fair-trial claim, where the claim challenged the evidence supporting the criminal proceeding.

Excessive detention

The court granted summary judgment on the excessive-detention claim. The detention from the late-afternoon arrest until Savarese’s arraignment the next day lasted approximately 18 hours, which the court treated as presumptively reasonable under the general 48-hour rule for judicial probable-cause determinations. The processing records showed routine steps rather than an unreasonable delay caused by retaliation, ill will, or an effort to gather additional evidence.

The court rejected Savarese’s contrary arguments because one relied on hearsay from an unidentified correction officer and the other relied on speculation that Mahoney had directed Central Booking to slow the processing.

Failure to intervene and supervisory liability

The court granted summary judgment on the failure-to-intervene claim. The officers had information supporting probable cause and no basis to believe that the arrest violated clearly established constitutional law. Burkitt could not be liable for failing to prevent an arrest that he himself made, and the evidence about what a bystander may have told him did not eliminate probable cause.

The court also rejected the supervisory-liability claim. Under the Second Circuit’s then-governing rule, a plaintiff must show that each government official personally violated the Constitution; there is no separate claim based solely on a supervisor’s failure to remedy or supervise subordinates. The court found no evidence that Burkitt, Mahoney, or Youmans personally violated Savarese’s constitutional rights.

Municipal liability

The court granted summary judgment for the City on Savarese’s municipal-liability claim. A municipality may be liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. Because the court found no underlying constitutional violation, the City could not be liable on that basis. The court also held that the evidence did not establish a sufficiently widespread or predictable City policy or practice of interfering with people’s First Amendment right to criticize or photograph police activity at the time of Savarese’s arrest.

Disposition

Judge Lewis J. Liman granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the defendants against Savarese and close the case. The court separately denied as moot the motions against Youmans at Docket Entries 70 and 81.