Jimenez v. Bosie, LLC

Background

Leocadio Jimenez sued Bosie, LLC doing business as Bosie Tea Parlor, Maria Arun Teas Inc., Nilesh Dawda, and Jessica Massias. He alleged that, during his employment at the Tea Parlor, the defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law by failing to pay overtime and failing to provide required wage statements and notices.

Dawda moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), which addresses personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(5), which addresses insufficient service of process. Dawda argued that the court lacked authority over him and that Jimenez had not properly served him. Jimenez stated that he served Dawda at the Tea Parlor by leaving the papers with Massias and later mailing them to the Tea Parlor address.

Personal Jurisdiction

The court held that Jimenez sufficiently alleged specific personal jurisdiction over Dawda. Under New York’s long-arm statute, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a person who purposefully conducts business in New York when the claims are connected to that business. The court emphasized allegations that Dawda owned a beneficial interest in the Tea Parlor, was listed as a principal officer on New York liquor-license filings, and controlled managerial matters such as hiring, work schedules, and employee pay.

Dawda submitted an affidavit stating that he was a resident of the United Kingdom, visited New York only a few times a year, and did not participate in the Tea Parlor’s daily decisions. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, the court was required to resolve factual conflicts and ambiguities in Jimenez’s favor. The court concluded that Dawda’s listing as a principal officer on the Tea Parlor’s liquor licenses sufficiently alleged that he transacted business in New York on behalf of the business.

The court also concluded that exercising jurisdiction complied with constitutional due-process requirements. It found that Dawda had sufficient minimum contacts with New York and that exercising jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances. The court therefore denied Dawda’s request to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Service of Process

For service of process, the court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), which permits service under the law of the state where the federal court is located, and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2). That New York provision permits service by delivering the summons to a person of suitable age and discretion at the defendant’s actual place of business and mailing the summons to that place within the required period.

Dawda did not dispute that the papers were delivered to a person of suitable age and discretion at the Tea Parlor. He argued instead that the Tea Parlor was not his actual place of business because he had never worked there, lived in the United Kingdom, described himself as a silent partner, and visited New York only occasionally.

The court rejected that argument. It concluded that Dawda’s ownership and officer status created a clear connection between his work and the Tea Parlor. The court also relied on the fact that Dawda was listed as a principal on the Tea Parlor’s 2019 and 2020 liquor-license filings. It held that the Tea Parlor was Dawda’s actual place of business and that Jimenez’s service there complied with New York law and Rule 4.

Disposition

The court denied Dawda’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. It also denied Dawda’s request for an evidentiary hearing as moot. The court directed the parties to appear for an initial conference and directed the Clerk to terminate the motion. The opinion did not decide the merits of Jimenez’s wage claims.