Fedele v. Marist College

Background

The opinion addresses two separate proposed class actions that were not formally consolidated but involved similar issues. Melanie Fedele sued Marist College. Nickesha Thomas and Noah Zacco sued Mercy College. The students alleged that they paid tuition and fees for the spring 2020 semester in exchange for in-person education, campus experiences, and related services. After the COVID-19 pandemic began, both colleges moved classes online and discontinued or limited some in-person activities. The students alleged that the colleges did not provide full tuition refunds and did not refund all applicable fees.

Each case asserted claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and money had and received. Marist moved to dismiss Fedele’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Mercy moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), which uses the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court found that subject-matter jurisdiction was adequately alleged under the Class Action Fairness Act at that stage of the cases.

Breach of Contract

The court held that the students’ contract claims were not barred by New York’s educational-malpractice doctrine. That doctrine generally prevents courts from deciding claims that would require them to evaluate educators’ professional judgments. The court concluded that these claims instead focused on whether the colleges made and breached specific contractual promises to provide in-person instruction and related services.

The court nevertheless held that neither group of plaintiffs plausibly alleged a breach of contract. Under New York law, a student suing a college must identify a specific, discrete promise and explain when and how the college breached it.

As to Marist, the court found that references to lecture and online course formats, classroom locations, schedules, buildings, rooms, instructors, and faculty office hours did not specifically promise that instruction would remain in person for the entire semester. Marist’s prior practice of providing in-person instruction likewise did not create a contractual entitlement to continued in-person classes. Fedele’s fee allegations were also insufficient because she did not identify which fees she paid or which fees Marist reimbursed, and she did not respond to Marist’s argument concerning the fee claim.

As to Mercy, the court similarly found that course-search options, course catalogs, course bulletins, class listings, and faculty-handbook language did not make a specific promise to provide in-person instruction or on-campus access. The Mercy plaintiffs’ allegations about prior in-person instruction did not establish such a promise. Their fee allegations were also conclusory and did not identify a specific promise to provide the in-person experiences, facilities, or events associated with the fees.

Other Claims

The court dismissed the unjust-enrichment claims because they were based on the same payments and conduct as the defective contract claims. The court rejected the argument that the students could preserve these claims merely by pleading them as alternatives, because the parties’ relationship was governed by an implied contract and the claims sought the same tuition and fee payments.

The conversion claims also failed. Conversion is the wrongful exercise of control over another person’s property. The court held that a requested pro-rated portion of tuition and fees was not specifically identifiable or kept separate. The claims also merely repeated the alleged contract breaches and did not allege a distinct wrong.

The money-had-and-received claims failed for the same reason as the unjust-enrichment claims: they duplicated the contract claims concerning the same tuition and fees.

Disposition and Amendment

Judge Briccetti granted Marist College’s motion to dismiss and granted Mercy College’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court denied the students’ informal requests for leave to amend because they supplied no proposed amendments and identified no additional facts that would cure the deficiencies.

The court nevertheless allowed the plaintiffs, by September 10, 2021, to file further amended complaints if the defendants consented or to file formal motions for leave to amend accompanied by proposed amended complaints and redline comparisons. The court stated that, if the plaintiffs did not do so, it would enter judgment and close the respective cases. The Clerk was instructed to terminate the two motions.