Gabilly v. City Of New York

Background

Julien Gabilly sued the City of New York and three New York Police Department officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, alleging excessive force, failure to intervene, and conspiracy. He also asserted New York-law claims for abuse of process, assault and battery, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He sought to hold the City liable under the rule governing municipal liability and under state-law vicarious-liability theories.

According to the amended complaint, Gabilly was driving in Manhattan on January 1, 2019, while facing the wrong way on a one-way street. He admitted drinking and driving and later pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for doing so. He alleged that, after he exited his vehicle and complied with the officers’ directions, Officers Dass and Sarante forcibly arrested him by throwing him to the ground and striking him. He further alleged that Officer Stinson filed a false criminal complaint accusing him of punching Officer Dass, that Dass submitted a false sworn affidavit, and that the officers submitted false reports portraying Gabilly as having used force against them.

Gabilly’s Motion

Gabilly moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). He argued that the court should accept the complaint’s allegations as true, disregard the defendants’ denials, and rule for him—or at least reject qualified immunity at that stage.

The court denied the motion in its entirety. It explained that when a plaintiff seeks judgment on the pleadings, the court must consider the defendants’ well-pleaded denials and allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the defendants’ favor. The answer disputed nearly all of the allegations relevant to Gabilly’s claims and raised twelve affirmative defenses. The court therefore concluded that the outcome would depend on developing a factual record about Gabilly’s conduct and the officers’ responses. The court did not impose sanctions, although it stated that the motion bordered on frivolous.

Defendants’ Cross-Motion

The defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the claims for conspiracy, abuse of process, and negligent infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed. Because defendants sought dismissal under Rule 12(c), the court applied the same standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim: accepting well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asking whether they plausibly support relief.

Section 1983 Conspiracy

The court dismissed Gabilly’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege an agreement among the defendants to act together to cause an unconstitutional injury, an act taken to advance that agreement, and resulting damages. Gabilly alleged that the officers coordinated false accounts to cover up excessive force and punish him for resisting arrest. The court held that the officers’ use of similar language in their reports, without additional facts showing an agreement or “meeting of the minds,” was insufficient.

Abuse of Process

The court declined to dismiss Gabilly’s New York abuse-of-process claim. The claim was based on his allegation that the officers used a criminal complaint falsely accusing him of resisting arrest to conceal their own allegedly excessive use of force. The court held that concealing an unconstitutional use of force, potentially to avoid personal liability, could qualify as an improper collateral purpose—an objective outside the legitimate purpose of the legal process.

The court also declined to resolve whether the officers had probable cause to accuse Gabilly of resisting arrest. Gabilly’s guilty plea established, at most for purposes of the ruling, probable cause for the driving-while-intoxicated charge; it did not necessarily establish probable cause for the separate accusation that he resisted arrest. The court therefore treated that issue as a disputed factual question and did not resolve it on the pleadings.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The court dismissed Gabilly’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Under New York law, that claim requires extreme and outrageous conduct, a causal connection to the injury, and severe emotional distress. The court held that such a claim cannot proceed when the alleged conduct falls within the scope of more traditional tort claims. Because Gabilly’s allegations were encompassed by his claims for excessive force, assault and battery, and abuse of process, the court dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

Disposition

The court denied Gabilly’s motion in full. It granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion. The court dismissed the Section 1983 conspiracy and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. The order did not state that those dismissals were with or without prejudice. The court scheduled a telephone status conference and directed the parties to file a joint letter about discovery and settlement efforts.