Bradford v. Leichstein

Background

Richard S. Bradford, appearing without a lawyer, filed the action on behalf of himself and his mother, Gleniss Bradford. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction and alleged that Yoel Leichstein, Asande Edwards, and Merdeen Evans, identified as employees of the Wayne Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, and Abraham Irizarry, identified as an Archcare Senior Life insurance manager, violated federally protected rights. The allegations concerned his mother’s admission and discharge from the nursing center, a purported extension of a rehabilitation contract, visitation restrictions, his efforts to act as his mother’s agent, alleged interference with her discharge to his care, and financial and other harms. He sought unspecified damages.

The opinion states that the complaint was not clear. It also notes that the caption spells the first defendant’s name “Leichstein,” while the body spells it “Lichstein.”

Claims on Behalf of Gleniss Bradford

The court held that Richard could not represent his mother because he was not a licensed attorney. It dismissed any claims asserted on Gleniss Bradford’s behalf without prejudice to an action she or an attorney may file representing her interests. The action therefore proceeded with Richard as the sole plaintiff.

Federal Claims

Because Richard alleged violations of constitutional and federally protected rights, the court construed the complaint as attempting to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law—meaning with authority fairly attributable to the state—deprives someone of federal rights.

The court found that Richard did not allege that Leichstein, Edwards, or Evans were state actors. It also stated that the Wayne Center appeared to be a private nursing home and that Richard alleged no facts showing that the center or its employees’ actions could be attributed to the state. Public funding, a state contract, or government regulation, standing alone, would not establish state action. The court therefore concluded that Richard failed to state a plausible § 1983 claim.

The court further stated that the allegations did not suggest a violation of federal statutory rights. It noted that the allegations about the quality of his mother’s care might implicate the Nursing Home Reform Act, but any rights under that law would belong to his mother, not Richard. The court also found that Richard’s loss of Medicaid or Medicare-related payments did not support a plausible federal claim.

Remaining Claims and Amendment

The court said that claims involving the bridge contract, breach of the original contract, revocation of Richard’s power of attorney, and financial harm might arise under state law. Because it dismissed the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims.

The court denied leave to amend because it concluded that the defects in the complaint could not be cured by amendment.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed Richard’s complaint, filed without prepaying fees, for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court denied Richard’s applications for appointed counsel as moot. It dismissed Gleniss Bradford as a party without prejudice, directed the clerk to terminate the other pending matters, and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, denying fee-free status for an appeal.