Andrews v. Johnson

Background

Carl Andrews, who was incarcerated at Yaphank Correctional Facility, filed the action without prepaying the filing fee. He sued Detective James Johnson; Assistant United States Attorneys Daniel Wolf, Benjamin Shrier, and Rushmi Bhaskaran; defense attorneys Susan Kellman, Ezra Spilke, and Kevin Keating; and Judge Paul A. Engelmayer. Andrews alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights during his arrest and criminal proceedings. He sought to be exonerated of all charges and requested money damages.

The complaint alleged that the defendants knew the Southern District of New York lacked jurisdiction over the criminal case and that Andrews should have been charged in the Eastern District of New York. Andrews asserted that Detective Johnson fabricated the case, destroyed evidence, and lied about a witness; that the prosecutors violated his rights to due process and a speedy trial; that his defense attorneys failed to provide effective assistance; and that Judge Engelmayer disregarded his constitutional responsibilities.

Screening standard

Because Andrews was a prisoner seeking relief from government-related defendants, the court screened the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court was required to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a legally sufficient claim, sought money from immune defendants, or fell outside the court’s jurisdiction. Although courts must read complaints filed by people without lawyers generously, the complaint still had to provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible.

The court treated Andrews’s constitutional claims against federal employees as claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, a judicially created remedy for damages against certain federal officials. The court noted that it was unclear whether a malicious-prosecution claim could proceed under Bivens, but it did not decide that issue because the claims failed for other reasons.

Claims against Judge Engelmayer

The court dismissed the claims against Judge Engelmayer under judicial immunity. Judges are generally absolutely immune from damages claims for actions taken as part of their judicial responsibilities, even when a plaintiff alleges bad faith or malice. Andrews did not allege facts showing that Judge Engelmayer acted outside those responsibilities or outside the court’s jurisdiction. The court also described these claims as frivolous under the prisoner-screening statutes.

Claims against the prosecutors

The court dismissed the claims against Daniel Wolf, Benjamin Shrier, and Rushmi Bhaskaran. Prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages claims for conduct within their official duties that is closely connected to the judicial phase of a criminal case. Andrews’s allegations about his speedy-trial and due-process rights concerned actions within the prosecutors’ official duties and connected to the criminal proceedings. The court therefore dismissed these claims as seeking money from immune defendants and as frivolous.

Claims against the defense attorneys

The court concluded that Susan Kellman, Ezra Spilke, and Kevin Keating were private attorneys. For purposes of a damages claim under Bivens, defense counsel cannot be treated as government actors merely because they represented a criminal defendant. Andrews therefore could not state a Bivens claim for damages against these defendants based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

Malicious-prosecution claim

The court held that Andrews failed to state a malicious-prosecution claim against Detective Johnson or any other defendant. A malicious-prosecution claim generally requires facts showing that the defendant initiated or continued a criminal prosecution, lacked probable cause, acted maliciously, and that the prosecution ended in a way indicating the plaintiff’s innocence.

The court acknowledged that Andrews’s allegations that Johnson fabricated the case, destroyed evidence, and lied about a witness could suggest that Johnson influenced the decision to prosecute. Even assuming Andrews could satisfy the requirements concerning Johnson’s involvement, lack of probable cause, and malice, the court held that he could not show favorable termination.

The charges in the Southern District of New York had been dismissed by a procedure called “nolle prosequi,” which the court explained generally dismisses an indictment without prejudice. The same charges were filed against Andrews in the Eastern District of New York the day before that dismissal. Because the dismissal did not indicate Andrews’s innocence, it did not satisfy the favorable-termination requirement for malicious prosecution. The court therefore dismissed the malicious-prosecution claims for failure to state a claim.

Request to intervene in the criminal case

To the extent Andrews sought to have the civil court stop or otherwise intervene in his ongoing criminal proceedings in the Eastern District of New York, the court denied that request. It explained that federal courts generally do not interfere with pending criminal prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances. The court found no facts supporting intervention and stated that challenges to the prosecution had to be raised in the criminal proceedings.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied Andrews leave to amend because the defects in the complaint could not be cured by amendment. The court dismissed the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii), terminated all other pending matters, and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The court therefore denied Andrews permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal.