Keyes v. The City Of New York

Background

Mytayari Keyes brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and Officers Manuel Silva, Peter Cassidy, and Michael Looney. The claims arose from Keyes’s March 1, 2017 arrest and later prosecution for forcible touching and third-degree sexual abuse. Keyes alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution. He also listed fair-trial, municipal-liability, and state-law claims, but abandoned those claims in response to defendants’ motion.

The officers were patrolling in plain clothes in Times Square. Cassidy testified that he saw Keyes approach a woman from behind and rub her buttocks. Silva testified that he saw Keyes touch between seven and nine women, including that woman. Looney observed Keyes following women closely and received a signal from Silva that Keyes had done something inappropriate. The officers arrested Keyes, and the woman told Looney that she did not feel anything and declined to speak further.

Cassidy later swore out a criminal complaint charging Keyes with forcible touching and third-degree sexual abuse. Silva prepared an affidavit concerning another alleged victim. Keyes went to trial in New York City Criminal Court, where the judge determined that defendants had probable cause for the prosecution and the criminal court acquitted Keyes.

Legal standard

The court considered defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the case and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view the evidence favorably to the party opposing the motion, but a claim proceeds to trial only if a reasonable factfinder could rule for that party.

False arrest

The court held that probable cause was a complete defense to Keyes’s false-arrest claim. Probable cause means information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the arrested person committed an offense. It does not require the officers’ belief to be correct, so long as the belief was reached in good faith. An officer may rely on another officer’s observations.

The court concluded that defendants had probable cause to arrest Keyes for forcible touching and third-degree sexual abuse. The officers’ observations, together with Keyes’s statement—“She did not say that I did this. . . . Doesn’t she have to press charges on me?”—were enough to support a reasonable belief that he had subjected women to nonconsensual sexual contact.

The court rejected Keyes’s arguments that factual disputes required a trial. It found that the officers’ differing accounts about how long they followed Keyes, where they were located, and the route Keyes took were minor inconsistencies that did not concern whether the officers were close enough to believe they saw him touch the women. The court also stated that even if Keyes did not actually touch the women, the officers’ good-faith belief that they had seen such conduct was sufficient for probable cause.

Malicious prosecution

The court also held that defendants had probable cause to prosecute Keyes. Probable cause to arrest generally supports probable cause to prosecute unless later information establishing innocence removes it. The court found that Keyes identified no such information between his arrest and prosecution. It also relied on the state court’s probable-cause determination, finding no evidence that the determination resulted from fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, or other bad-faith police conduct.

Disposition

Judge J. Paul Oetken granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The ruling resolved the false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims in defendants’ favor, and the Clerk of Court was directed to close the motion at Docket Number 63 and close the case.