Christina v. The City of New York

Background

Christina Gavin sued Sergeant Matthew Tocco, Inspector Gerard Dowling, and the City of New York over her November 22, 2019 arrest at a protest in Harlem. She alleged state and federal claims for excessive force, false arrest, and denial of a fair trial. She also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services, alleging that the City failed to train New York City Police Department officers to give protesters an opportunity to disperse and reach safety after officers issued a dispersal order.

According to Gavin’s amended complaint, officers ordered protesters to disperse, but a bus blocked one route to the sidewalk and heavy traffic blocked the other. Gavin alleged that Tocco and Dowling grabbed her arms, kicked her legs, and handcuffed her after she tried to find a safe way off the street. Tocco and Dowling later swore in a criminal complaint that Gavin had jumped on Dowling’s back while the officers were arresting another protester. Gavin accepted an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, an agreement that avoided prosecution, and the charges were later dismissed.

The defendants moved to dismiss Gavin’s fair-trial and Monell claims. The opinion also notes that Gavin’s amended complaint made the defendants’ earlier motion to dismiss moot, and that earlier motion was denied accordingly.

Fair-Trial Claim

Gavin based her fair-trial claim on the alleged fabrication of evidence by Tocco and Dowling. The defendants argued that her adjournment in contemplation of dismissal was not a favorable termination of the criminal case.

The court agreed with the defendants. It held that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonough v. Smith, a fabricated-evidence claim requires the criminal proceedings to have ended favorably for the accused. The court concluded that an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not meet that requirement because it is a negotiated dismissal and does not imply that the accused was innocent. The court therefore dismissed Gavin’s fair-trial claim. The opinion did not add a with-prejudice or without-prejudice qualifier to that disposition.

Monell Claim

A Monell claim seeks to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for an official policy, practice, or training failure that caused a constitutional violation. The court explained that inadequate police training can support municipal liability only when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to people’s rights.

The court found Gavin’s allegations sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage as to training concerning dispersal orders. Gavin identified her own experience and three earlier cases involving allegations that New York City police officers prevented protesters from meaningfully complying with dispersal orders. She also cited depositions and a City Law Department report that, according to the complaint, supported an inference that the NYPD had not corrected alleged training problems. The court held that these allegations plausibly described a continuing history of mishandled protest dispersals and deliberate indifference.

The court separately stated that Gavin’s allegations were insufficient to support Monell claims based on alleged kettling of protesters or false testimony because, apart from her own experience, the complaint did not provide allegations about those practices. The court’s discussion of the surviving Monell claim concerned dispersal orders and opportunities to leave.

Discovery and Disposition

The defendants also asked the court to separate discovery on the Monell claim from discovery on the individual officers’ liability. The court granted that request, reasoning that the City’s liability depended on the individual defendants’ liability and that the issues required substantially different evidence. Discovery concerning the Monell claim was stayed, while discovery on the excessive-force and false-arrest claims was allowed to continue. The court stated that this decision was without prejudice to whether any trial should later be separated.

The court concluded that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Gavin’s fair-trial claim was dismissed; her Monell claim concerning dispersal-order training survived the motion to dismiss; and discovery on that Monell claim was stayed. The defendants were ordered to answer the remaining claims within 21 days after the opinion and order.