Tasfay v. Ramos

Background

Jama M. Tasfay and Desmond Rolle, who were representing themselves, sued Acacia Network, Inc., Johani Vialet-Rodriguez, Nadia DiSalvo, and Melissa Ramos. They alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving the First and Fourth Amendments.

The plaintiffs alleged that they lived in a Department of Homeless Services shelter operated by Acacia until they were removed on or about May 31, 2019. They alleged that Ramos notified them on May 30 that they would be removed the next day; DHS police then forcibly removed them, seized belongings, and held them outside the apartment. They also alleged that DiSalvo hit a plaintiff’s hand while the plaintiffs tried to record the encounter, causing a scratch and redness.

The Acacia defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The municipal defendants had filed a separate motion, but the court did not address it in this order.

Fair Housing Act claims

The court dismissed the Fair Housing Act claims against the Acacia defendants. Because the plaintiffs did not allege direct evidence of discrimination, the court applied the framework requiring facts that plausibly suggest, among other things, discriminatory intent.

The court held that the complaint did not provide enough facts supporting the proposition that the defendants were motivated by race. The complaint stated that the only reason Ramos would have taken the alleged action was to discriminate and that Ramos knew the plaintiffs’ race from Department of Homeless Services records. The court found these allegations conclusory and also found that the complaint did not allege discriminatory intent by the Acacia defendants. The court therefore dismissed this claim even under the more forgiving standard applied to self-represented litigants.

Section 1983 claims

Section 1983 provides a claim for damages when a person is deprived of a constitutional or federal statutory right under state law. The Acacia defendants argued that Acacia Network could not be sued under Section 1983 because it was not a statutory “person.” The court rejected dismissal on that basis at this stage. It stated that, on the existing record, it could not conclude that Acacia was not a “person” for Section 1983 purposes.

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Johani Vialet-Rodriguez. The complaint alleged only that Vialet-Rodriguez, Acacia’s director, was present when DHS police removed the plaintiffs. The court held that being present, without more, did not show the personal involvement required for damages under Section 1983.

The defendants also argued in a footnote that the alleged conduct did not violate the plaintiffs’ First or Fourth Amendment rights. The court declined to consider that argument because it was presented without supporting authority or meaningful argument.

Disposition

Judge Alison J. Nathan granted in part and denied in part the Acacia defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the Fair Housing Act claims, dismissed Vialet-Rodriguez as a defendant, and denied the motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against Acacia Network, Inc. The order did not rule on the municipal defendants’ separate motion. The court also denied the plaintiffs permission to appeal without paying fees, finding that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.