Tsinberg v. City of New York

Background

Leon G. Tsinberg, a non-admitted attorney proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He challenged the City’s ticketing, immobilizing, towing, and storage of his 2009 Nissan Altima. The tickets mainly concerned an expired registration, and the City entered default judgments after Tsinberg did not respond. The five tickets relevant to the towing originally totaled $325, but penalties increased the amount to more than $600. The City placed a boot on the vehicle on January 29, 2019, and towed it the next day. The vehicle remained in storage and accumulated storage fees.

Tsinberg alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy, the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures. He also asserted municipal liability under § 1983, a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and state-law claims for conversion, trespass to chattels, and defamation.

Motion and standard

The City moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave recommended granting the motion. Tsinberg objected. Judge Engelmayer reviewed the report and recommendation in full and adopted it, while explaining that the procedural-due-process issue did not necessarily depend on the rule barring federal review of the merits of certain state-court judgments.

Federal claims

The court dismissed the procedural due-process claims. It held that affixing the tickets to the vehicle and mailing notice used methods authorized by state and local law, and that the City was not required to anticipate that Tsinberg would be out of state and use additional methods such as telephone calls or email. Tsinberg later learned of the judgments and had opportunities to challenge or pay them. The court also found that he was not required to use the City’s online dispute application because other dispute methods were available. His failure to properly pursue a state-court proceeding did not make the available post-deprivation remedy constitutionally inadequate.

The court also dismissed the substantive-due-process claim because the ticketing and towing, carried out under established state and local laws, did not plausibly qualify as arbitrary, outrageous, or conscience-shocking conduct.

The court dismissed the double-jeopardy claim because the parking penalties were civil rather than criminal sanctions. Tsinberg did not show that the fines, penalties, and storage costs were so punitive in form or effect that they became criminal punishments.

The court dismissed the excessive-fines claim. It assumed, without deciding, that the Excessive Fines Clause could apply to the penalties at issue, but held that Tsinberg had not plausibly alleged that the penalties were grossly disproportionate to his conduct. The court considered the original tickets, increased penalties, and fees for booting, towing, and storage, and concluded that the allegations did not meet that standard.

The court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim. It held that the City’s seizure of the vehicle was authorized by state and local law after valid judgments exceeded the statutory threshold, and that Tsinberg had not plausibly alleged that the towing and impoundment were unreasonable. The language on the execution concerning child support, spousal support, maintenance, or alimony did not establish that the vehicle had been seized for one of those reasons; the court read that language as listing legally available bases for enforcement.

Because Tsinberg did not plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation, the court dismissed his municipal-liability claim against the City. Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a policy or custom that directly caused a constitutional violation, and the court found no predicate violation to support that claim.

The court dismissed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim for two independent reasons: the statute does not apply to actions by municipal employees, and it does not cover a creditor collecting a debt owed directly to itself. The City was collecting parking-related debts owed to the City.

State-law claims and leave to amend

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims. It dismissed the conversion, trespass-to-chattels, and defamation claims without prejudice to pursuing them in state court.

The court denied further amendment. Tsinberg had already amended once after seeing the City’s initial dismissal arguments, and he did not identify facts that another amendment could add to cure the defects. The court concluded that another attempt would be futile.

Disposition

The court adopted the report and recommendation, granted the City’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed Tsinberg’s claims without leave to amend. The federal claims were dismissed with prejudice. The state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice to Tsinberg’s ability to pursue them in state court. The Clerk was directed to close the case.